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LuIS ESLAVA**
Constitutionalization of Rights in 
Colombia: Establishing a ground for 
meaningful comparisons* 
Colombia is the quintessential example of a democracy able to persist 
over a very long time at remarkably low level of quality.1
… [U]nder these circumstances, and above all in the great urban areas, 
the lack of access to justice translates not only into a feeling of frustration, 
but also into violence.2 
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ABSTRACT
Considered out of context, the 1991 Colombian Constitution might be read 
as an extension of a trend in constitutional reform that has swept the world 
since the early 1970s, renewing state commitments to the Social Rule of Law 
model and human rights. Accordingly, the Colombian constitutional reform 
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could be described as a copy-cat reform, whose failure resides in the internal 
ambivalences of the Social Rule of Law model and human rights discourse, and 
is starkly revealed in the social, political and economic reality of Colombian 
citizens. This paper problematizes this position: instead, the paper argues that 
the Colombian constitutional text should be read and evaluated on the basis 
of its particularities. The paper outlines reasons for studying the Colombian 
Constitution as a socio-juridical phenomenon, situating the constitutional text 
beyond its normative nature and the interpretative boundaries of the law. By 
adopting this approach, the paper concludes that the socialization of the nation-
building project in Colombia has been an impressive achievement of the 1991 
political and legal constitutional experiment, but that distinctive failures of 
Colombia’s constitutional reform can also be identified in this process.
KEy WORDS
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RESUMEN 
Considerada fuera de contexto, la Constitución colombiana de 1991 es leída 
como la materialización de una tendencia reformista mundial que, desde 
la década de los setenta, ha pretendido renovar los compromisos estatales 
a través del modelo de Estado social de derecho y la protección de los de-
rechos humanos. En este sentido, la reforma constitucional colombiana es 
descrita como una simple imitación cuyos fracasos se evidencian de forma 
dramática en la realidad social, política y económica en la cual aún viven 
los colombianos y que emergen de las ambivalencias internas del modelo 
de Estado social de derecho y del discurso de los derechos humanos. Este 
artículo discute el anterior argumento resaltando que el texto constitucional 
colombiano debe ser leído y evaluado con base en sus particularidades. El 
artículo propone estudiar la Constitución colombiana como un fenómeno 
socio-jurídico, situando el texto constitucional más allá de su naturaleza 
normativa y de los límites interpretativos del derecho. Adoptando tal posi-
ción, el artículo concluye que la socialización del proyecto de construcción 
de Estado en Colombia ha sido un resultado muy significativo, aunque no 
ajeno a singulares fracasos, del experimento político y legal de 1991. 
PALABRAS CLAVE
Colombia, Constitución, 1991, Estado social de derecho, derechos humanos, 
construcción de Estado
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INTRODUCTION
Colombia welcomed the last decade of the twentieth century with a new 
constitution and a new form of government. The Social Rule of Law State 
(Estado social de derecho) was the core concept of the 1991 Constitution. As 
a result of a constituent assembly that embraced ideas of diversity, equality 
and participatory democracy, the new Constitution looked to a liberal state as 
the natural requirement of democracy, and the materialization of human rights 
as the benchmark of justice. The constitutionalization of a Social Rule of Law 
State, based on a generous bill of rights, was modeled on the 1948 German 
Constitution and the 1978 Spanish Constitution.3 This constitutional change 
in Colombia followed an international trend for the constitutionalization of 
human rights that has been occurring since the early 1970s.4 Characteristic 
of almost all the new constitutions is the privileged position occupied by 
a bill of rights, and the social and political significance of judicial review 
mechanisms by their constitutional courts.5 A country that has experienced 
long periods of political and social turmoil, Colombia embarked on the 1991 
3. See 1948 German Constitution, art. 20,1 and 1978 Spanish Constitution, art., 1,1. Both 
constitutions were based on the same political model articulated by the German-Austrian legal 
scholar and socialist philosopher herman heller. See especially herman heller. Escritos 
políticos (1985) 283. david dyzenhaus. Legality and Legitimacy, Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen 
and Herman Heller in Weimar (1997), 161.
4. Apart from Colombia, just in Latin America these are the countries inscribed in the trend 
of constitutionalization: Chile (1980), Nicaragua (1987), Brazil (1988), Peru (1993), Bolivia 
(1994), Venezuela (1999), Argentina (1994), Paraguay (1992), and Ecuador (1998). This trend 
is defined by hirschl, as one of the most significant developments in comparative law, and one 
of the most significant phenomena in late twentieth and early twenty-first-century legal and 
government theory. ran hirschl. ‘The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerments through 
Constitutionalization: Lessons form four Constitutional Revolutions’, in robert dahl, ian 
shapiro, and josé antonio cheibub (eds.). The Democracy Sourcebook (2003), 232. See also: 
james Gibson, GreGory cladeira and vanessa baird. ‘On the Legitimacy of National High 
Courts’ (1998) 92 American Political Science Review 343; and neal tate and torbjorn vallider. 
The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (1995). See on the European case: alec stone sweet. 
‘Constitutional Dialogues: Protecting Rights in France, Germany, Italy and Spain’, in sally j. 
Kenney, william m. reisinGer and john c. reitz. Constitutional Dialogues in Comparative 
Perspective (1999). See on constitutionalization of rights in post-communist countries: jeFFrey 
sitzer. ‘Experimental Constitutionalism: A Comparative Analysis of the Institutional Bases of 
Rights Enforcement in post-Communist Hungary’, in sally j. Kenney, william m. reisinGer 
and john c. reitz. Constitutional Dialogues in Comparative Perspective (1999). 
5. According to lee van cott, six trends can be identified in these constitutions: (1) a 
propensity to create European-style constitutional tribunal; (2) the introduction of new rights, 
including all three generations of human rights; (3) and increasing acceptance of binding inter-
national law, particularly with respect to human rights; (4) the incorporation of institutions and to 
procedural figures to protect certain fundamental constitutional rights (such as the ombudsman–
in the case of Colombia the office of the People’s Defender–el Personero del Pueblo), and the 
writ of injunction (or amparo/tutela); (5) a concern for the better functioning of the judiciary 
to address endemic governmental corruption; and (6) contradicting these trends is a shift in 
economic policy that promotes the shrinking and privatization of the State and its functions and 
the restriction of social and economic rights to conform to the new neoliberal economic model. 
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constitutional reform seeking positive change. In order to achieve an elusive 
peace, Colombia’s Constitutional Assembly posed the enactment of a new 
constitution as a reconciliatory, forward-looking project. The new constitu-
tion was charged with significant normative and synchronizing capabilities 
over the whole production and interpretation of the law in Colombia.6 The 
Constitution was placed at the peak of the legal system, permeating the exist-
ing Colombian Law with ideals democracy and social justice.7 The impact of 
the new constitution has been profound: without doubt, the 1991 Constitu-
tion and its fundamental rights have radically altered Colombia’s legal and 
social milieu. However, they have not done so in a straightforward fashion. 
The consequences of constitutional change have unfolded in the context of 
Colombian legal culture, a traditional, formalistic legal culture that opera-
tes in an unequal society, where life above the poverty line and outside the 
conflict can seem like a luxury.8 
As a result, considered out of context, the 1991 Constitution could simply 
be read as a paradigmatic case of parrot-like reform, a déjà vu, whose total 
failure is underscored by the social, political and economic situation that 
Colombian people still experience.9 This paper disagrees with this position. 
Following leGrand’s suggestion for more meaningful approaches to compara-
tive legal studies, the Colombian Constitution should be understood accord-
ing to its own development.10 The aim of this paper is to establish a ground 
for studying the Colombian Constitution as a socio-juridical phenomena – a 
ground that takes the constitutional text beyond its simple normative nature 
and, consequentially, beyond the interpretative boundaries of the law. Only 
Donna Lee van Cott, The Friendly Liquidation of the Past: The Politics of diversity in Latin 
America (2000), 16. 
6. javier pérez royo. Las fuentes del derecho (1988), 31.
7. roGelio pérez-perdomo and lawrence. m. Friedman. ‘Latin Legal Cultures in the Age 
of Globalization’, in lawrence. m. Friedman and roGelio pérez-perdomo. Legal Culture in the 
Age of Globalization: Latin America and Latin Europe (2003), 6.
8. According to the “Colombian Poverty Report”, published in 2002 by the World Bank, the 
number of Colombians living under the poverty line (national poverty rate) decreased between 
from 80% in 1978 to 60% in 1995; during the same period, the extreme poverty rate decreased 
from 45% to 21%. However, from 1995 to 1999 the poverty rate increased to 64% while the 
extreme poverty rate rose to 23%. carlos eduardo vélez (et al.). Colombian Poverty Report 
-World Bank (2002), ix.
9. See especially, laurence whitehead. ‘Reforms: Mexico and Colombia’, in manuel 
antonio Garretón and edward newman (ed.). Democracy in Latin America: (Re)constructing 
political society (2001), 93-94. 
10. pierre leGrand. ‘Alterity: About Rules, For Example’, in peter birKs and arianna 
pretto. Themes in Comparative Law: In honour of Bernard Rudden (2002), 21. See also, 
bernhard GrobFeld. ‘Comparatists and languages’, in pierre leGrand and rodericK monday 
(ed.). Comparative legal studies: traditions and transitions (2003), 182. See in particular on 
differences of this approach with Legal Transplants: pierre leGrand. ‘The Impossibility of ‘Legal 
Transplants’ ’ (1997) 4 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law; alan watson. 
‘Legal Transplants and European Private Law’ (2000) 4 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 
4 [www.ejcl.org/ejcl/44/44-2.html] at 25 April 2006.
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in its own social context should the Constitution be expected to justify its 
own existence and repercussions. Adopting this approach, this paper argues 
that impressive achievements, as well as failures, have resulted from Co-
lombia’s 1991 political and legal experiment. I will evaluate the constitution 
successes and failures in terms of its capacity to socialize nation building 
in Colombia. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, I describe the particulari-
ties of the constitutionalization of rights in Colombia, identifying them as 
the proper departure point for a valid scrutiny of the effects of the 1991 
Constitutional reform. In this first section I will expand the theoretical 
framework that drives the paper taking distance from certain critical read-
ings that oversimplify – according to my view – the social nature of human 
rights. Secondly, I examine the historical and social context in which the 
Constitution was implemented. To do this, it will be necessary to outline the 
evolution of violence in Colombia, both as a consequence and a cause of legal 
inefficacy and the plurality of legal orders in Colombia. Thirdly, I outline the 
development of the Constitution and the interpretation that the Constitutional 
Court (hereafter the Court) has made of the new Constitution’s bill of rights. 
Finally, I identify some successes and failures of the constitutionalization of 
rights in Colombia.
I. POSING THE QUESTION
Critical interrogations of the normativization of human rights often depart 
from the presumption that there is a nation-state structure, or national elites, 
with enough social manoeuvrability to apply and enforce norms and rights 
effectively. In the case of right-wing analysis, constitutional reforms tend 
to benefit a few in power, while restraining room for governmental decision 
and market functioning.11 On the other hand, more left-wing critiques have 
equated constitutional reforms with legal reformism, in which universal 
principles discipline the territory of local identities and community values.12 
Although both approaches reveal the ways in which governments and courts 
may use constitutional crafting for policymaking and social control, they 
are not adequate for situations where the State is extremely weak and/or the 
category of national elites is strongly contested. What would be the role, 
effects and repercussions of a constitutionalization of rights in this scenario? 
Furthermore, in societies that lack national hegemonic agents, these criti-
11. See e. g. cass r. sunstein. ‘The Negative Constitution: transitions in Latin America’, 
in irwin p. stotzKy (ed.). Transitions to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the Judiciary 
(1993), 374 -375.
12. douzinas describes the encounter points of both right and left critiques: costas douzinas. 
The End of Human Rights, Critical Legal Thought at the turn of the Century (2000), 164. 
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ques do not explain the origin and desire of people for unity and security. 
As douzinas points out, in institutional or political vacuums where despair 
and violence uncontrollably arise, people crave the principle of the One, 
for new foundational principles or new unitary historical actors.13 However, 
giving the intertwine between ideologies, political mobilization and law, 
these unifying forces have often been represented in legal corpus, in the 
case of Constitutions, or validated through a legalistic ethos, in the event of 
government reforms. If this is the case, the law as element in the quest for 
social order: how should be understood the trade off between the controlling/
manipulative intentions of law and the agency involved in the call for and 
use of legal archetypes? While these unresolved queries do not annul critical 
projects on constitutionalization of rights, they reveal a possible role that 
law could play in the popular quest for consistency and coherence within 
fragmented and heterogeneous struggles for justice.14 
Three further considerations must be acknowledged. Firstly, assuming 
that there is a competent, functional state is inappropriate for the vast num-
ber of nation-states where power is strongly contested, and where a chaotic 
contingency of power ruins aspirations for social inclusion or social welfare. 
The definition of the law that I will use here acknowledges that law exceeds 
the norms, acts and codes that emanate from State institutions. A reductionist 
definition based on state legal centralism fails to recognise how societies 
are increasingly regulated by more than one legal system. Rather than being 
exclusively ordered by the official law, modern societies are regulated by 
a plurality of legal orders, interrelated and socially distributed in the social 
and geographical field in different ways.15 State law cohabits with others 
types of law, but also with social uses and interpretations of law in everyday 
circumstances, sites, and settings. As a consequence of its diverse origins, 
the law not only regulates but also constitutes or creates social phenomena.16 
However, a plurality of laws does not by itself imply an adequate normative 
situation. In santos’s words, ‘there is nothing inherently good, progressive, 
or emancipatory about legal pluralism’.17 The concept of law, the elements 
of the Law, and its uses make it an instrument of social regulation and social 
emancipation, depending in how it functions as a symbol of violence and/or a 
symbol of social power. Mutatis mutandis, positing the constitutionalization 
of rights as a straightforward imposition without considering the grassroots 
13. Ibid., 171. douzinas complements his analysis on Human rights in costas douzinas 
and adam Gearey. Critical Jurisprudence: The Political Philosophy of Justice (2005).
14. douzinas. The End of Human Rights, above n 12, 171. 
15. boaventura de sousa santos. Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization 
and Emancipation (2nd ed., 2002), 89.
16. roGer cotterrell. ‘Law as Constitutive’, in International Encyclopedia of Social and 
Behavioral Sciences (2002), 8499. See also j. GriFFiths. ‘Legal Pluralism’, in International 
Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences (2002), 8650-8654.
17. santos, above n. 15, 89.
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social counteraction to constitutional reform obscures the law’s role in so-
ciety - at large and on the individual agency.18 The law is one of the gears 
within social control, social conflict or social change. Either as moral code 
or as semiotic discourse, the law should be understood as a feature of social 
relations that allows the construction of social systems of action.19 For the 
purposes of this paper, the symbolic connotations of the State, groups and 
social practices with legal/normative implications merit more attention. 
Secondly, critical theory often ignores the counter-hegemonic side of law. 
Even in fully capable States that have sufficient legitimacy to apply the law, 
the law can agitate the political and social milieu. In States where authority is 
contested, especially at the periphery, some uses of law can provide a terrain 
for social contestation that a weak State cannot offer.20 The majority of the 
critical theorists consider that the symbolic effects of law operate only to the 
benefit of State institutions and their aims of political manipulation.21 How-
ever, too much emphasis on the unitary character of state domination leads 
critiques to a rather simplistic image of law as an institutional mechanism for 
social control. The strength of state legal domination undermines the possibil-
ity – even if it is often remote – of emancipation from hegemonic structures 
through progressive norms that were supposed to have only material effects. 
Others, however, more disposed to accept certain autonomy in the symbolic 
use of law, consider that while a considerable institutional advantage may 
exist relative to the possibilities of appropriation and political manipulation 
of legal meanings, social movements and individuals can also use these 
artifacts in their favour.22 Still in situations of overwhelming odds, people’s 
use of rights and judicial enforcement carries the possibility of articulating 
alternatives to their reality.23 Therefore, considered locally – stepping away 
from the presumption that law is self-sufficient and self-producing – the law, 
in the form of human rights or decolonized public-law theory, has been used 
with counter-hegemonic outcomes.24 
18. herbert jacob. ‘Introduction’, in herbert jacob et al. (ed.). Courts, Law, and Politics 
in Comparative Perspective (1996), 13.
19. mauricio García-villeGas. ‘Symbolic Power without symbolic violence?’ (2003), 55 
Florida Law Review (2003), 172.
20. sousa santos. Toward a New Legal Common Sense, above n. 15, 450.
21. marK tushnet. ‘An Essay on Rights’, 62 Texas Law Review (1984), 1363; robert w. 
Gordon. ‘Some Critical Theories on Law and Their Critics’, in david Kairs (ed.). The Politics of 
Law: A Progressive Critique (1998); joan roeloFs. ‘Judicial Activism as Social Engineering: A 
Marxist Interpretation of the Warren Court’, in stephen c. halpen and charles m. lamb (eds.). 
Supreme Court Activism and Restrain (1982); duncan Kennedy. ‘American Constitutionalism 
as Civil Religion: Notes of an Athiest’ (1995), 19 Nova Law Review. 
22. See especially: sousa santos. Toward a New Legal Common Sense, above n. 15. 
23. laura nader. The Life of the Law: Anthropological Projects (2002), 167.
24. See especially upendra baxi. ‘The Colonialist heritage’, in pierre leGrand and 
rodericK monday (ed.). Comparative legal studies: traditions and transitions (2003), 53; roGer 
cotterrell. ‘Comparatists and sociology’, in pierre leGrand and rodericK monday (ed.), 
Comparative legal studies: traditions and transitions (2003), 146.
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Thirdly and finally, it is worth noting that legal progressivism in the south 
must be reviewed cautiously. Since the 1970s, the major international deve-
lopment agencies have dedicated a large fraction of their resources and time 
promoting judicial authority, and procedural efficiency in civil and criminal 
jurisdictions.25 Nonetheless, as uprimny and García-villeGas have observed, 
the situation of constitutional judges has been different: firstly, they have 
rarely been the beneficiaries of this international economic aid because they 
are considered too politically embedded and abstract; and secondly, their de-
cisions usually affect essential hegemonic interests, not contractual stability 
or impassable property rights.26 In view of all these factors, constitutional 
law might be a double-edge sword, even in the complicated scenario of the 
south.27 
In this essay, I will argue that the encounter between Colombian reality 
and the 1991 Constitution offers some valuable, particular insights for more 
conventional critiques on constitutionalization of rights. Even though criti-
ques based on the language, method, and sources of legitimacy of the human 
rights discourse have a bearing on the Colombian experience, I would argue 
that a total renunciation of the constitutionalization of rights is unwarranted 
in this case. It is too easy to formulate a critique against the 1991 Constitu-
tion on the basis of general arguments against the constitutionalization of 
rights. Instead, it is important to notice that the Court and its interpretation 
of the 1991 Constitution’s bill of rights emerged to fill the institutional gap 
in Colombia left behind by the State.28 
The concept of hegemony in Gramsci, understood as an arena of struggle 
for political meaning, is important for the defense of this position.29 However, 
25. Under the banner of “Law and Development”, the promotion of governance and rule 
of law have occupied the agenda of scholars and international development agencies. See on 
critiques especially james Gardner. Legal Imperialism: American Lawyers and Foreign Aid in 
Latin America (1980). See on the new wave of Law and Development in South America: stephen 
Golub. Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy: The Legal Empowerment Alternative, Carnegie Paper 
n. 41 (October 2003). 
26. Both contractual stability and social interpretation of property rights have been contested 
terrains in Colombian Constitutional jurisdiction. See especially: salomón Kalmanovitz. Los 
efectos económicos de la Corte Constitucional (1999); salomón Kalmanovitz. Constitución y 
modelo económico (2001).
27. In this regard, uprimny and García-villeGas have advanced a very fruitful scholarship 
on this particular area. See especially: rodriGo uprimny and mauricio García-villeGas. ‘The 
Constitutional Court and Social Emancipation in Colombia’, in boaventura de sousa santos 
(ed.). Reinventing Social Emancipation: Toward New Manifestos, Volume 1: Democratizing 
Democracy - Beyond the Liberal Democratic Canon (2005).
28. As the Indian Court has done. See e. g. upendra baxi. ‘Taking Suffering Seriously: 
Social Action Litigation before the Supreme Court of India’, in upendra baxi. Law and Poverty: 
Critical Essays (1988); upendra baxi. ‘The Avatars of Judicial Activism: Explorations in the 
Geography of (In)Justice’, in S. K. verma and Kusum (eds.). Fifty Years of the Supreme Court 
in India: Its Grasp and Reach (2000), 156-209; upendra baxi. ‘Preface’, in S. P. Sathe, Judicial 
Activism in India (2001). 
29. García-villeGas. ‘Symbolic Power without symbolic violence?’, above n. 19, 157. 
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under the Gramscian rubric that “the exercise of hegemony” binds society 
together,30 the dysfuntionality of institutions, law and actors in Colombia 
stems in part from an endemic lack of an identifiable hegemony or historical 
block.31 As a result, in the case of law, it has been widely used but in permanent 
dispute. Such disputability has fostered a fragmented popular acceptance of 
law, as well as a plurality of paralegal spheres of social action.32 Nonetheless, 
the highly contested nature of the law makes it a potential source of eman-
cipation.33 When the law offers dignity that the State cannot provide, legal 
technologies have catapulted individual and social aspirations.34 The 1991 
Constitution grew out of this mixed scenario, and it is in this context that 
meaningful critiques and comparisons can be made.35 The path followed by 
the Court has initiated a process of normativization of the Constitution and 
de-formalization of the existing highly positivistic legal hermeneutics. In 
doing so, it has established itself as an identifiable terrain for social reven-
dication. Achieving some level of institutional hegemony, the constitutional 
pronouncements have also been able to foster a constitutionalization of daily 
30. antonio Gramsci. Selections from the Prison Notebooks (1971).
31. nazih richani. Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Co-
lombia (2002), 15.
32. See e. g. , antonio carlos wolKmer. ‘El pluralismo jurídico: Elementos para un ordena-
miento alternativo’ (1993) Crítica Jurídica, 13; antonio carlos wolKmer. Pluralismo jurídico: 
Fundamentos de una nueva cultura en el Derecho (3rd ed. 2001); césar rodríGuez. ‘Editor’s 
Introduction’ (2003) 26 Beyond Law, 7.
33. For instance, according to maría clemencia ramírez’s study of el movimiento de los 
cocaleros in Putumayo, southern part of Colombia, the common trait of indigenous social 
movements in Colombia, is the sense of extreme exclusion from a state, which is ambiguously 
absent and immanent. As a result, the struggle to construct citizenship is a struggle for “the right 
to have rights” against abandonment, stigmatisation, and marginalisation. Through the demand 
for “membership” into the community of the already considered citizens, excluded inhabitants 
form the social contract are exercising a “politics of citizenship”. maría clemencia ramírez. 
‘The Politics of recognition and Citizenship in Putumayo and in the Baja Bota of Cauca: The 
Case of 1996 Cocalero Movement’, in boaventura de sousa santos (ed.). Reinventing Social 
Emancipation: Toward New Manifestos, Volume 1: Democratizing Democracy - Beyond the 
Liberal Democratic Canon (2005), 239.
34. The use of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen during the independence 
is probably the most memorable appeal of law in a counter-hegemonic action. But, there are 
also more subtle examples of uses of law with emancipatory notes. Continuing with the study 
of el movimiento de los cocaleros, since the politics of citizenship is carried out in the midst of 
the armed conflict, in a zone dominated by the army, the paramilitaries, and the guerrillas, the 
“construction of citizenship” becomes a form of resistance and empowerment. In this context, 
citizenship is not simple a legal status but a form of identification, a type of political identity; 
‘something to be constructed, not empirically given.’ chantal mouFFle. ‘Democratic Citizens-
hip and the Political Community’, in Chantal Mouffle (ed.). Dimensions of Radical Democracy 
(1992), 231. 
35. See e. g., dieGo eduardo lópez medina. Teoría impura del derecho - La transformación 
de la cultura jurídica en América Latina (2004).
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life, a nascent habitus, for articulating more benevolent arenas within the 
intricate Colombian phenomenon of legalism without State.36 
II. FROM COLONy TO REPUBLIC: FROM INEFFECTIVENESS OF LAW TO 
VIOLENCE
Before reviewing the constitutionalization of rights in Colombia, I want to 
explore in more detail the historical background that supports the nature of the 
law in Colombia. While the ubiquitous, international referent for Colombia 
is drug trafficking, the common ground for many Colombians is violence – 
often related to drugs, but more usually a consequence of basic inequalities 
of power that have been present since colonial times.37 Violence here is not 
reduced to physical injury: in the daily life of many Colombians, violence 
encompasses material deprivation, physiological unrest and class and race 
disadvantage. This fact is reflected in popular descriptions of violence as 
‘common’, ‘endemic’, and even ‘unbound’.38 Cynically, Colombia is still 
considered a model of democratic stability and economic growth in Latin 
America.39 Beneath this bloodless contradiction, there are two themes worthy 
of further inquiry: (A) the ineffectiveness of law and (B) legal pluralism.
A. INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE LAW
At the heart of Colombia’s nation-building enterprise, there is a special place 
for the law and, more specifically, for the constitutionalization of political, 
social and economic ambitions.40 The lack of political and administrative 
experience in the Hispanic colonies at the beginning of the 19th century, 
hand-in-hand with the post-colonial republics’ search for legitimacy, neces-
sitated the adoption of legal models of political organization nurtured by other 
revolutions, particularly the American and French revolutions. However the 
36. See on habitus: pierre bourdieu. Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977), 261. See 
also: loïc wacQuant. ‘Habitus’, in jens becKert and milan zaFirovsKi (eds). International 
Encyclopedia of Economic Sociology (2005), 315-319.
37. See especially: jorGe l. esQuirol. ‘Continuing Fictions of Latin American Law’ (2003) 
55 Florida Law Review 41, 109. See also: esQuirol. ‘The Fictions of Latin America Law (Part 
I)’ (1997) Utah Law Review 426.
38. caroline moser and cathy mcilwaine. Encounter with Violence in Latin America: 
Urban poor perceptions from Colombia and Guatemala (2004), 3.
39. For instance, the World Bank’s website introduces Colombia in these terms: In a country 
struggling to end decades of conflict that has taken rural areas of the country hostage, Colombia’s 
sound democratic political system and years of sustained economic growth remain resilient. The 
World Bank, Colombia [worldbank.org] at 23 May 2006.
40. linn a. hammerGren. The Politics of Justice and Justice Reform in Latin America (1998), 
232-252.
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reception of the foreign revolutionary ideologies and institutions in South 
America did not always occur directly, homogeneously, or peacefully. Inde-
pendence from Spain ignited fratricidal independence wars with ethnic and 
class overtones.41 New legal and political ideas were channeled through the 
hands of local Creole elites, who were typically landowners, conservative, 
and Catholic, while new political movements were concentrated in the urban 
centres of colonial administration, where the dispute for power had tradition-
ally been acted out.42 
In Colombia, as for many other Latin American countries, the birth of the 
nation-state was not accompanied by the autochthonous political battle with 
the ancien régime that ignited the French Revolution, nor by the colonial 
autonomy and class uniformity of the struggle for American Independence. 
Revolutions in Latin America have typically involved the continuity of co-
lonial social and institutional practices, such as patronage and clientelism, 
which then permeates the post-colonial application of law.43 In post-colonial 
times, the production of rational, abstract, and universalistic law addressed 
the question of how to emulate American and French political technolo-
gies in an unpromising terrain. Even though the post-colonial legal project 
aspired to liberté, égalité, and fraternité, it could neither erase the memory 
of three hundred years of law as imperial command, nor achieve uniform 
changes in the socio-economic institutions of the neo-republican inhabit-
ants. Finally, it could not overcome its past of class domination: slavery, for 
instance, remained stubbornly legal in Colombia until 1857. In other words, 
the historical revolutionary process in Colombia came to be seen as transfer-
ence of power from a foreign monarchic elite to the local Creole elite.44 The 
41 In the case of Colombia, according to stadistics collated between 1778 and 1780, La 
Nueva Granada, the name of Colombia at the time, had 800.000 inhabitant. Most of them lived 
in small country municipalities of 5.000-15.000. Bogotá, in the last quater of the eigtheen century, 
had 20.000. anthony mcFarlane. Colombia antes de la independencia: Economía, sociedad y 
política bajo el dominio borbón (1997).
42. There was not such equality proclaimed by the revolutionary independentist leades. 
Colombia’s population was formed by Indigenous, African-Blacks, White-Europeans, and 
mestizos–a broad mixture of many levels of racially mixed but free Creols. Mestizos represented 
46%, whites 26%, indigenous 20%, and black slaves 8%. jaime jaramillo uribe and Germán 
colmenares. ‘Estado, Administración y Vida Política en la Sociedad Colonial’, in Manual de 
historia de Colombia (1992).
43. See e. g., Francisco leal buitraGo and andrés dávila ladrón de Guevara. Cliente-
lismo: el sistema político y su expresión regional (1990).
44. In words of mauricio villeGas, 
Detrás del igualitarismo formal proclamado por los próceres de la independencia 
permanecía una división del trabajo entre clases sociales: mientras los criollos descen-
dientes de España asumían los nuevos cargos públicos, los indios y los negros seguían 
siendo la fuerza animal que cavaba minas, cultivaba haciendas y plantaciones, construía 
caminos, levantaba iglesias y edificios públicos. (García-villeGas. ‘Apuntes sobre 
codificación y costumbre en la historia del derecho colombiano’ (2003), Precedete 
2003, 107).
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selection of constitutional models and law in general remained a matter of 
political legitimacy, rather than a question of instrumental efficacy or social 
relevance.45 
Under the conditions of precarious hegemony that characterized colonial 
governments throughout the 19th century in Latin America, a culture devel-
oped with a widespread perception of the illegitimacy of power, thwarting 
attempts to construct a rule of law regime based on effective rather than 
logocentric law. Since 1580, the Spanish colonists in Colombia pursued a 
policy of total transformation of autochthonous structures and legal systems: 
Spanish law was the only law recognized by the State.46 Therefore, a system 
of de jure legal plurality never developed. Instead, a proliferation of unofficial 
legal fields – that is, a de facto legal plurality – was common and worked 
successfully against a unified, coherent, effective colonial law. Colonial 
governments – and following Independence, sovereign States – were not 
successful in creating legal systems that enjoyed both social recognition and 
instrumental effectiveness. The law produced in Spain was rarely interpreted 
and applied in the way it had been envisaged in the metropolis.47 The large 
territories and the cultural diversity of Latin America’s inhabitants, as well 
as a shortage of economic resources and social polarization based on race 
and lineage, produced its own interpretation of the imperial law (el derecho 
indiano).48 
Nonetheless, the instrumental inefficacy of the law was neither an unex-
pected outcome of the law’s understanding, nor a whim of the political leaders 
in the struggle for independence. It was something derived from the concep-
tion of the law itself. In Colombia, the law has historically been understood 
as the fruit of the abstract entity of popular sovereignty, brought to life by 
legislators and governors. From here the law derives its political function and 
social representativeness. The classic theory of law in Colombia is of law as 
a hybrid between the Napoleonic Code49 and its formalistic appraisal (école 
45. mauricio García-villeGas and césar rodríGuez, ‘Law in Society in Latin America: 




48. The main official/legal compilation of the time is the Recopilación de Leyes de Indias 
(1680). The legislation tended to be uniform for all Spanish colonies, as it was for the different 
parts of Brazil. The structure of colonial administration (King—colonial council—viceroys—
audiencias) and the mechanisms of administrative and judicial control (visita and residencia) 
were similar for Spain and Portugal. R. pérez-perdomo. ‘Law in Latin America’, in International 
Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences (2002), 8526-8527.
49. The first napoleon Civil Code transplanted into Latinoamerica was Código Civil de 
Oaxaca (1827-1829). It was followed by Bolivia (1831), Costa Rica (1841), República Domini-
cana (1845), and Chile (1855). The Chilean Code started a second wave of civil law transplants 
whitin Latin America. It was adapted (a second hand transplant) to Colombia (1873), Venezuela 
(1862), Uruguay (1868), Paraguay (1876), Argentina (1869). 
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de l’exégese),50 the Germanic private-Roman law with its syllogistic reason-
ing, and, during the twentieth century, the infusion of hans Kelsen’s “Pure 
Theory of Law”.51 As a result, even though the law is intentionally blind to 
its social lack of success, it pushes ideologically for a process of egalitarian 
amalgamation based on presumptions such as equality before the law. The 
law does not need to be effective: it is sufficient that it is rightly produced 
and interpreted to formally exist. The conditions of abstraction and formal 
interpretation have allowed the law to cohabit with a great cultural, social 
and economic hybridism. Under these conditions, multiple legal fields and 
codes of conduct emerged as a result of class difference, diverse identities and 
regional variation. They materialized an indispensable social hermeneutics of 
the law where elevated aspirations confront stubborn factuality.52 The political 
and legal arrangement in contemporary Colombia depends on the cognitive 
dissonance at its foundation, and the projection of this dissonance into the 
future. According to García-villeGas and rodríGuez, ‘the gap between the 
written law and reality does not seem then to be a dysfunction or a failure of 
these models but rather its characteristic element.’53
Since colonial times, a disarticulation between the law and social reality 
has existed. The law has been used for hopeful discourses of change, peace 
and unity, as well as self-serving attempts to legitimate political power.54 
This culture of legal inefficacy has undermined the consolidation a singular 
hegemony status on the head of the State. Laws and their institutions beco-
me dysfunctional without an effective hegemony exercised by a dominant 
group – or small population within a class – that projects moral authority 
and leadership, and that is accepted by both the establishment and society at 
large. In Colombia, the production of law has allowed the shell of the State 
and its atomized ruling members to remain stable, while there is a general 
sense of society falling apart. This has become known as the Colombian 
Paradox. In their respective disciplines, political, social, legal and economics 
50. With the adoption of the Chilean Civil Code, there was the direct application of exegetic 
principles of interpretations. The pinnacle of this hermeneutics is placed on the aphorisms: “la ley 
es una declaración de la voluntad soberana manifestada en la forma prevenida en la constitución 
nacional” (art.4); la costumbre, “[...] en ningún caso tiene fuerza contra la ley” (art. 8); and “la 
ignorancia de la ley no sirve de excusa” (art. 9).
51. hans Kelsen. Pure Theory of Law (2nd ed, 1967).
52. In Latin American the clearest example of the interaction between the official legal 
law and the grassroots paralegal norms emerges in shantytowns of big cities. See especially on 
favelas in Brazil; boaventura de sousa santos. Law against Law (1974); sousa santos. ‘The 
Law of the Oppressed’ (1977) 12 Law & Society Review; sousa santos. ‘Notas sobre a história 
jurídico-social de Pasárgada’, in claudio souto and joaQuim Falcão (eds.). Sociologia e Direito 
(1980). See on the case of Peru - from an economic reading, hernando de soto, El Otro Sendero 
(1989).
53. García-villeGas and rodríGuez, above n. 45, 25.
54. García-villeGas. ‘Apuntes sobre codificación y costumbre en la historia del derecho 
colombiano’, above n. 44, 98.
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commentators in Colombia have pointed out the country’s resilient capacity 
to remain in a painful state of stability. The Colombian State can maintain its 
long-standing democratic ethos, a functioning economy within the context of 
a civil war, a small population who are outward-looking and oriented towards 
the developed West, while, sharing the same geographical space, political 
corruption, uncontrollable violence and massive poverty.55 
Uncritical readings of this reality have prompted endless waves of legal 
reform. alberto alesina’s interpretation epitomises this type of reformist 
tendency. For alesina, ‘Colombia faces a critical juncture in its recent history, 
one road leads to civil war, chaos, and economic collapse. The other leads 
to peace, reforms, and economic progress.’56 In order to solve the antinomy 
between these extremes, the reformist solution begins by defining Colom-
bian reality as a relationship that contradicts itself and is therefore absurd 
or contradictory. Regardless his apparent clarity, alesina’s view obscures 
the consequences of perpetuating the Colombian “paradoja macondiana”, 
the belief that there are two realities paradoxically entwined, but materially 
disconnected. One is a reality characterized by violence and misery, the other 
embraces peace and progress. On one side, a Colombia that is one of the 
most unequal and violent countries in the world, and, on the reverse side, a 
country with a flamboyant democratic heritage and an impeccable external 
debt record. yet the paradox does not interrogate blandishments such as “one 
of the oldest democracies in Latin America” or “a country with long term 
sustained economic growth”, but poses Colombia as ‘a fascinating case study 
of what can go wrong and how to fix it.’57 From this perspective, the only 
answer is a new wave of legal production and institutional reforms that will 
close the gap.58 In the reformist endeavor, the production of law has become 
a substitute for the political system, establishing lines of communication 
between the State and the citizenry without materializing such policies. In 
other words, the production of law or legal reformism stands in for, often in 
55. See e. g. cepal. Panorama social de América Latina (1999). See in the case of inequality 
and access to justice: césar A. rodríGuez. ‘La Justicia Civil’, in boaventura de sousa santos 
and mauricio García-villeGas. El Caleidoscopio de las Justicias en Colombia (2001). See on 
the case of inequality and law: leopoldo múnera. ‘La justicia es pa’ los de ruana’, in O. correas 
(ed.). Sociología jurídica en América Latina (1991); juan méndez, Guillermo o’donnell and 
paulo pinheiro (eds.). The (un)rule of law in Latin America (1999). See on inequality and eco-
nomy: marcelo m. GiuGale, oliver laFourcade and connie luFF. Colombia: The Economic 
Foundation of Peace (2003).
56. alberto alesina. ‘Introduction and Summary’, alesina (ed.). Institutional Reforms: 
The Case of Colombia (2005), 1.
57. Ibid.
58. The international project in which alesina’s was involved focused on reforms on the 
following areas: (1) institutional separation of political powers; (2) electoral and party system; 
(3) punitive legal system; (4) regional and local administration; (5) treasury; (6) educational 
system; (7) social spending; and (8) the independence of Colombian central bank. Ibid.
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a merely symbolic fashion, the incapacity of the State to respond the social 
demands for security, social justice and participation.
The underbelly of this unusual configuration of law, State and society, is 
that politics in Colombia does not function as a field of mediation for social 
conflicts, which must be solved by other, often violent, means.59 Justifica-
tions for exceptional, extra-legal behaviour are also common in almost every 
aspect of Colombian social life: from the proliferation of armed groups, 
drug trafficking, illegal economies, tax evasion, exploitation of workers, 
sexual offenses and family violence to squatting in public property, informal 
economies, repeated missed payments of mortgages or school fees, and so 
on.60 It is also frequently the case that State’s intervention or nonintervention 
in specific social spaces is carried out in such a chameleonic way that they 
vary by the geographical setting and the area under regulation.61 As mean-
ingless norms continue to pile up, obedience to the law is constantly ruled 
out as an ethical way of action. The ordinary citizen’s attitude of disobedi-
ence, distrust or simply negligence concerning the need to comply with the 
law continues despite almost 200 years of republican history.62 However, 
the mismatch of form and substance, and subsequently law’s precarious 
regulatory power, are reflected today by how the symbolic powerfulness of 
law cohabits with its instrumental weakness. michael taussiG summarizes 
this in a striking way:
[In Colombia] the universe of right and wrong is territorialized by a grid of laws, 
and each law is numbered. The signs against smoking cigarettes in the airports 
have the number of the relevant law made prominent, as do the notices on TV 
59. álvaro tirado mejía. ‘Violence and the State in Colombia’, in eduardo posada carbó 
(ed.). Colombia: The Politics of Reforming the State (1998), 124; mauricio García-villeGas. 
‘Law as Hope: Constitution and Social Change in Latin America’ (2001-2002) 20 Wisconsin 
international Law Journal 2, 364.
60. An illustrative case is how the cars are driven not just in Colombia, but in many Latin 
American countries. According to lima lopes: 
Although the traffic laws are the same as those in the majority of countries in the Northern 
hemisphere and developed economies, the effective behavior of drivers and pedestrians 
turns out to be much different from that prescribed by the laws. Latin American cities 
are invaded by traffic signs and signals. But it would appear that their significance is 
quite limited in practical terms. Stop signs tend to mean, at best, “Slow Down.” Traffic 
lights may represent something more than an invitation to reduce speed, nevertheless, 
the probability of someone ignoring a red light is great. This behavior has a particular 
impact. Traffic becomes unpredictable to the extent that it is not enough to comply with 
the established signals: each driver must approach the corner and evaluate, in each con-
crete case, whether or not she should stop. Many times, a look from the other driver is 
what determines whether or not one needs to stop. (josé reinaldo de lima lopes. ‘Law 
of Inequalities: On the Non-universal forms of Legal Pluralism’, in césar rodríGuez 
(ed.), 26 Beyond Law (2003), 92).
61. García-villeGas and rodríGuez. ‘Law in Society in Latin America’ above n. 45, 46.
62. Ibid., 39.
Revista Derecho del Estado198
warning against sex and violence in an upcoming show [...] But the numbers 
never fit reality – neither the reality of the human condition nor the reality of the 
subtle distinctions necessary to law.63
B. VIOLENCE AND PARADOX
In Colombia, violence is structural and law production plays a role within 
this.64 Shoulder by shoulder since the Spanish Conquest, systematic violence 
has structured human experience in what is now the territory of Colombia.65 
The current internal conflict in Colombia has evolved for over 150 years, 
beginning with the struggle between Conservative and Liberal parties in the 
nineteenth century and La Guerra de los Mil Días that left 100,000 people 
dead, a struggle that escalated during a fourteen-year period from 1948 to 
1964 known as La Violencia.66 La Violencia is a simple name to identify a 
social, highly collectivized process that took at least 200,000 lives, including 
112,000 – that is, one percent of Colombia’s population – during the period 
1948-1950.67 This was followed by El Frente Nacional, a disempowering 
institutionalization of bipartisanship between the late 1950s and the early 
1970s, which thereafter welcomed twenty-five years of rule under the per-
manent emergency powers of the executive to control social unrest.68 Today, 
violence in Colombia is a complex system of interdependent conflicts with 
63. michael taussiG. Law in a Lawless Land: Diary of a Limpieza in Colombia (2003), 
16.
64. According to paul Framer, structural violence is ‘a broad rubric that includes a host 
of offensives against human dignity: extreme and relative poverty, social inequalities ranging 
form racism to gender inequality, and the more spectacular forms of violence that are human 
rights abuses, some of them punishment for efforts to escape structural violence.’ paul Framer. 
Pathologies of Power: Health, Human Rights, and the New War on the Poor (2003), 8.
65. Many artists in Colombia have collated the imaginary of violence. In literature, some of 
the most influential titles are: josé eustasio rivera’s novel La Vorágine (1924), Gabriel García-
márQuez’s La Mala Hora (1962) and Gustavo álvarez Gardeazábal’s Cóndores no entierran 
todos los días (1972). See especially: santiaGo villaveces –izQuierdo. ‘Looking backward and 
Forward: A Pre(Re)View’, in GeorGe e. marcus (ed.). Cultural Producers in Perilous States: 
Editing Events, Documenting Change (1997), 376.
66. See especially: Germán Guzmán campos, orlando Fals borda, and eduardo umaña 
campos. La violencia en Colombia (2005); paul oQuist. Violence, Conflict, and Politics in 
Colombia (1980).
67. oQuist, above n. 66, xi. See on new perspectives on the social, political and geographical 
dynamics of La Violencia; mary roldán. Blood and Fire (2002).
68. bruce michael baGley. ‘Colombia: National Front and Development’, in robert 
wesson (ed.). Politics, Policies, and Economic Development in Latin America (1984), 125. See 
on El Frente Nacional and its effects: Gary hosKin. ‘Colombian Political Parties and Electoral 
Behavior During the Post-National Front Period’, in donald l. herman (ed.). Democracy in 
Latin America: Colombia y Venezuela (1988), 47; R. albert berry and Francisco e. thoumi. 
‘Post-War and Post-National Front Economic Development of Colombia’, in donald l. herman 
(ed.). Democracy in Latin America: Colombia y Venezuela (1988), 63. 
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some visible emerging features: a cross-national state of “undeclared” war, 
that has different levels of intensity depending the region, city or town, and 
even the neighbourhood; a subsequent official policy of counter-terrorism 
and force; an economic crisis that impacts those most affected by violence; 
and, finally, a general sense of despair expressed by active reclusion in urban 
self-protected clusters (such as condominios and conjuntos residenciales). 
Since 1980, some 100,000 people have died directly as a result of the conflict, 
and two million desplazados have lost their property and employment, and 
now subsist at the fringes of society. Another million have left the country 
altogether.69 Furthermore, the multiplicity of actors70 in the conflict is fuelled 
by the availability of substantial economic resources, principally from narco-
trafficking in the case of guerrilla organisations, paramilitary groups, and 
urban gangs; and from the “War on Drugs”, in the case of the official army 
and politicians.71 Consequently, profits from the sale of cocaine manage to 
lubricate a seemingly unwinnable war while maintaining a good fraction of 
the State’s economy.72
In this situation, fragmented interpretations of the law arise in Colombia. 
They permit a multiplicity of quasi-legal, quasi-illegal practices. Looking 
to reconcile law with social reality, a sort of natural law emerges that gives 
69. marcelo m. GiuGale. ‘Synthesis’, in marcelo m. GiuGale, oliver laFourcade and 
connie luFF. Colombia: The Economic Foundation of Peace (2003), 2. See also: Francisco 
Gutiérrez sanín and ana maría jaramillo. ‘Paradoxical Pacts’, in boaventura de sousa santos 
(ed.). Reinventing Social Emancipation: Toward New Manifestos, Volume 1: Democratizing 
Democracy: Beyond the Liberal Democratic Canon (2005), 215.
70. The main actors of the current violence in Colombia are: Colombia’s largest guerrilla 
insurgency, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo [Farc-ep]), the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación 
Nacional [eln]) and , Colombia’s right-wing paramilitary groups, in turn, trace their origins to 
small “self-defence groups” formed by local landowners and businessmen to defend themselves 
and their property against violence, operating with the tolerance of, and often in collusion with 
Colombian military units, and to death squads created by drug cartels in the 1970s and 1980s. 
See e. g. United Nations Development Programme. El conflicto, callejón con salida: Informe 
nacional de desarrollo humano para Colombia, Bogotá, undp (2003), 285-319.
71. For instance, $800 million US dollars are the amount allocated for the 2007 Plan Colombia 
by the US Congress and the US Defense Department. See especially: ‘Cámara de Representantes 
de E.U. aprobó 640 millones de nueva ayuda a Colombia para 2007’, in El Tiempo, June 9 2006, 
at [eltiempo.terra.com.co/judi/2006-06-09/articulo-web-_nota_interior-2939858.html] at 10 
June 2006. See on War on Drugs: cynthia j. arnson and teresa whitField. ‘Third Parties and 
Intractable Conflicts: The Case of Colombia’, in chester a. crocKer, Fen osler hampson and 
pamela aall. Grasping the Nettle: Analysing Cases of Intractable Conflict (2005), 231; The 
Heritage Foundation. Helping Colombia Fix Its Plan to Curb Drug Trafficking, Violence, and 
Insurgency (April 26, 2001); douG stoKes. America’s Other War: Terrorizing Colombia (2005); 
Grace livinGstone. Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democracy, and War (2004); noam chomsKy. ‘Plan 
Colombia’ (Spring 2001) 6 Alternative Press Review 1; Garry leech. Killing Peace: Colombia’s 
Conflict and the Failure of U.S. Intervention (2002). 
72. jimmie briGGs. Inocent Losts: When Child Soldiers Go to War - Ch. 2. “Sometimes I Feel 
Like Killing”; Violent Childhoods in Colombia (2005), 41. See generally: Francisco thoumi. 
Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia (1995).
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authority to those who have the means to take it. Guerrillas, paramilitaries, and 
formal gangs share the State’s failure as their rationale but most of the time, 
they do no more than perpetuate a situation of exploitation and oppression. 
Worse, they have dispersed throughout the whole society the pernicious use of 
physical and psychological violence as a valid means of social interaction.73 
The outcome has been a social implosion: a violent reciprocity based on the 
fear of the similar and of oneself. Given that personal response is the way 
to secure life and property, individual actions have became boundless. Due 
to the other may use violence; one should fear everyone; one is validated to 
use violence.74 Because every one is entitled to appeal to this natural law, 
anyone can be a victim and anyone can be the victimizer.75
Today, the official army, paramilitaries, guerrillas and urban gangs 
continue taking over territory, imposing their duties and obligations on the 
local inhabitants and dispensing their own version of justice. The different 
forms of justice are delivered according to their author: imposing taxes, 
restructuring entities, arresting the poor: when is the State; controlling State 
departments and the public service: in the case of politicians; and displacing 
indigenous populations, kidnapping the rich or the poor, cleansing and other 
malaises: when the army, guerrillas, paramilitaries and common delinquency 
are involved.76
Independencia, La Guerra de los Mil Días, La Violencia, El Frente Nacio-
nal, and drug-related conflict constitute a succession of events that has taken 
over the State as a battleground for faction disputes. They have molded a 
State that is no capable of providing a political space for the construction of a 
national identity or a bureaucratic umbrella distinct from political forces.77 The 
actors in these battles neither re-distribute power nor concentrate the totality 
of the State. None of them is capable to advance their project consistently; 
rather, they just battle for a stake in the nation building project in Colombia. 
As paul oQuist observed almost twenty-five years ago, Colombia’s famous 
stability is simply a disguise for a structure of social domination that denies 
the overwhelming majority of the population access to socioeconomic and 
73. lima lopes, above 60, 91. See in the case of Colombia violence and the perpetuation of 
fear: caroline moser and cathy mcilwaine. Urban Poor Perceptions of Violence Exclusion in 
Colombia (2000); moser and mcilwaine, above n. 38.
74. Regardless of gender, belief, ethnicity and age, everyone is part of this implosion. One 
out of every four irregular combatants in Colombia is under the age of eighteen. Guerrilla and 
paramilitary groups, in particular the FARC-EP, continue to recruit and use child soldiers. Human 
Rights Watch. Colombia: Armed Groups Send Children to War (February 22, 2005) [www.hrw.
org/english/docs/2005/02/22/colomb10202.htm] at 20 May 2006. See also; julie m. lamb, 
mercy levy and michael r. reich. Wounds of War (2004), 32; andrea peña. ‘Infancia Infeliz’ 
(2006) Semana.com [www.semana.terra.com.co] at 28 July 2006.
75. Gutiérrez sanín and jaramillo, above n. 69, 195. 
76. caroline moser. ‘Violence in Colombia: Building Sustainable Peace and Social Capital’, 
in andrés solimano. Colombia: Essays on Conflict, Peace, and Development (2000), 16-17.
77. rodríGuez, García-villeGas and uprimny, above n. 2, 138.
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political power, and therefore circumscribes their ability to satisfy – even 
minimally – their most basic necessities, ‘[a] scenario of social contradictions 
that presages the continued maturation of violence.’78
In this space of contestation of the law and its uses, the 1991 Constitution 
can be seen as another production of law, another expression of faith, a belief 
in the law’s capacity to provide a technical answer to the social, political, 
and economic ills that face Colombia.79 yet, what differentiates it has been 
its core focus: the survival of those caught in the cross fire of the Colombian 
conflict. Without losing sight of its utopian, iconoclastic and defiant origin, 
the 1991 Constitution and its rights have been applied with one eye on the 
constitutional text and another on the social situation. Adopted after a process 
of public debate that included participation by demobilized guerrilla groups, 
indigenous and religious minorities, the 1991 Constitution came to life as the 
symbol of peaceful rebellion, held within institutional channels and against 
arbitrariness, exclusion, and abuses of power.80 
III. 1991 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLy: INPUTS AND OUTCOMES
Determined to overcome the grim outlook for Colombia law at the end of 
last century, the aspirational soul of the Constituent Assembly aimed to 
transform an entrenched social and political reality into a social revolution.81 
This Assembly, summoned in 1990 through democratic elections, repealed 
the 1886 Constitution and adopted a new Constitution. The 1886 Constitution 
was brief in text and ambitions, general, coherent, and technically well-
wrought. The 1991 Constitution, on the other hand, is generous in text and 
spirit, written in plain language, and idealistic instead of precise. In addition 
to these differences of form, both constitutions are operatively very different. 
The 1886 Constitution was merely an informative text, without much social 
relevance. The current Constitution, however, has become the legal, political 
and economic foundation of Colombia. These differences have made the 
1991 Constitutional text a common social referent, a status that the 1886 
Constitution could never have achieved. 
78. oQuist, above n. 66, 238. 
79. joe FoweraKer, todd landman and neil harvey. Governing Latin America (2003), 
80.
80. peel, above n. 1, 108-109.
81. According to van cott, the 1991 Colombian Constitution can be described as a post-
nationalist constitution due to its aspiration to construct a national identity and unity around 
diversity. See especially: van cott, above n. 5, 10. García-villeGas asserts also that ‘the 1793 
French constitution and Colombia’s current 1991 Constitution are good examples of aspirational 
constitutions. The United States constitution – despite the foundational political philosophy that 
inspired it – may, in contrast, be seen as an example of Protective constitution’: García-villeGas. 
‘Law as Hope’, above n. 59, 354.
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The constitutional reform process began with a twofold purpose: (1) to 
promote participatory democracy and empower citizens for direct, effective 
involvement in the public and private decision-making processes, and (2) to 
strengthen State institutions, especially the judiciary, with the aim of level 
vast social inequalities and struggles of authority and power. In order to ar-
ticulate these targets, the traditional Rule of Law State (Estado de derecho) 
was exchanged for a more socially conscious political model: the Social Rule 
of Law State (Estado social de derecho).82 It became the State’s responsibil-
ity, under this new social dimension, to ensure that well-being and equality 
were adequately ensured for all.83 Additionally, a series of mechanisms and 
institutions were introduced in the Constitution to facilitate that the text 
was applied at both the abstract level and in quotidian disputes. Besides the 
establishment of a Constitutional Court, the Constitution also extended the 
constitutional jurisdiction to all judges in Colombia. It extended the catalogue 
of acts and decisions subjected to be reviewed ex-officio by the Court, and 
included a generous bill of rights backed up by a powerful guardianship writ, 
the tutela. These reforms represented a twofold strategy by the Constituent 
Assembly to tackle the legal rigidities of a country deeply embedded in a 
tradition of legal ineffectiveness.
A. NORMATIVIZATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
In order to ensure the desired constitutional enforcement, a whole system of 
bodies, new procedures, and new criteria to guide constitutional interpretation 
was adopted in 1991. The Court was created with the specific functions of 
safeguarding the integrity and supremacy of the Constitution,84 and the figure 
of a Public Ombudsman (Defensoría del Pueblo) to protect and promote the 
charter of fundamental human rights was established.85 New procedures were 
introduced to safeguard different types of rights and interests protected by 
the Constitution, including a writ to order administrative authorities to fulfil 
their legal mandates in specific situations (Acción de Cumplimiento),86 to 
protect collective rights (Acción Popular),87 to secure rights of specific social 
82. 1991 Colombian Constitution (thereafter: Colombian Const.), art. 1.
83. Felipe saez. ‘The Judiciary’, in marcelo m. GiuGale, oliver laFourcade and 
connie luFF. Colombia: The Economic Foundation of Peace (2003), 829. See especially: 
C-1064/2001.
84. Col. Const. Title viii, Chapter 4. 
85. Col. Const. arts. 281-283.
86. Col. Const. art. 87.
87. Col. Const. art. 88.
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groups (Acción de Grupo)88, and finally the writ of protection of fundamental 
rights (Acción de Tutela).89
With incipient roots in the 1858 Constitution, and effectively since a 
constitutional reform in 1910, constitutional review, either concrete review 
or abstract constitutional review, have been part of judicial practice in Co-
lombia.90 However revision by the Supreme Court, the constitutional peak 
body before 1991, was very restricted. Concrete constitutional review only 
operated to decrees issued under states of siege or economic emergency, and 
it was carried out after their declaration. Under the 1991 Constitution, any 
citizen could appear before the Court to file a claim against a norm through 
the public unconstitutionality writ.91 yet perhaps the most visible advance-
ment in the process of normativization of the Constitution for the Colombian 
people at large has been its generous bill of rights and the writ of tutela.92 The 
1886 Constitution did not grant significant protection to fundamental rights. 
Rather, it merely stated a number of liberties and social guarantees, which 
were understood to be simple prerogatives given by the State to individuals, 
but without specific mechanisms to remedy violations.93 
88. Col. Const. art. 88.
89. Col. Const. art. 86. Hereinafter tutela cases, Sentencias de Tutela, are referred as T; 
Sentencias de Unificación, when the Court unifies a precedent, they are referred as SU; and in 
the case of abstract constitutional review cases, Sentencias de Constitucionalidad, are referred 
as C. They will be followed by their reference number, and finally, the year of the decision.
90. See especially; 1856 Colombian Constitution – Constitución de la Confederación 
Granadina – art. 50, and 1910 Constitutional Reform – Acto Legislativo Número 3, 31 October 
1910, art. 41. It is also important to mention that between the 1856 Constitution and the 1910 
constitutional reform, Colombia had the 1886 Constitution. Heavily marked by conservative 
political values, the 1886 Constitution erased the constitutional review from the Colombian 
constitutional map. In 1910 liberal ideas were brought to limit the executive power and to 
constrain public administration by a renewed set of Constitutional premises.
91. In addition to decrees issued under any state of exception, the Court must carry out an 
automatic review, ex-officio, of the following types of laws: (1) all laws that approve international 
treaties, as well as the treaties themselves; (2) statutory laws, which are reviewed by the Court 
before the President signs them; (3) acts that summon a constituent assembly or a referendum to 
modify the Constitution, which can only be reviewed for procedural validity; and (4) approval or 
derogation referendums, as well as other democratic participatory mechanisms such as national 
popular consultations and national plebiscites. See especially: Col. Const. arts. 104-105 and Ley 
134 de 1994 (Ley Estatutaria sobre los Mecanismos de Participación Popular). 
92. Which resembles the Spanish system. The Spanish Constitutional Tribunal was esta-
blished by the 1978 Constitution, and started its work in 1980. The Tribunal has jurisdiction 
over conflicts between state authorities; the petition of amparo against administrative acts and 
court decisions interfering with fundamental rights; the lawfulness of treaties in the light of the 
Constitution; and the constitutionality of laws. Under the present Spanish Constitution, an indi-
vidual may invoke this writ to request the Constitutional tribunal to assure the protection of his 
or her fundamental rights against an administrative act or judgment of a court, when the ordinary 
courts have not provided such protection. See especially: vicKi c. jacKson, marK tushnet. 
Comparative constitutional law (1999), 471-472. See also: néstor iván osuna patiño: Tutela 
y amparo: derechos protegidos (1998).
93. manuel josé cepeda espinosa. ‘Judicial Activism in a violent context: The origin, role 
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In 1991, the bill of fundamental rights was strategically adopted to trans-
cend mere words. In order to achieve this goal, the writ of tutela has played a 
crucial role. The writ enables any person whose fundamental rights are being 
threatened or violated to request that a judge with territorial jurisdiction pro-
tect that person’s fundamental rights. Citizens may file the claims informally 
without an attorney. The judge is legally bound to give priority attention to 
the request over any other business. In accordance with the requirements of 
the specific situation under revision, the tutela procedure allows the judge to 
order the adoption of any measure necessary to protect threatened fundamental 
rights, even before pronouncing a final judgment. Furthermore, every single 
tutela can be potentially reviewed by the Court, which will select those that 
it considers necessary to correct or pertinent for the development of its own 
case law, and issue a corresponding judgment.94 
The tutela is formally defined in the Constitution as a means to protect 
fundamental rights in the Constitution. However, in order to preserve the 
constitutional mandates in real-life situations, the Court has issued numerous 
and uniform decisions expanding the catalogue of rights, the effects of tute-
la decisions and the subjects of a plaintiff’s claim. For example, the Court 
rejected all formalist theses that sought to restrict the tutela to the catalogue 
of rights included in the Constitution.95 The Court emphatically rejected a 
minimalist or numerous clausus view of the rights. Since Decision T-002 
of 1992, the Court has developed an approach centered on guaranteeing the 
rights and principles that the tutela was created to defend, instead of focussing 
exclusively on the right’s literal description. In the same vein, the Court has 
considered international humanitarian law, and international human right 
law treaties ratified by the legislative, to be constitutionally relevant, and 
therefore directly enforceable.96
and impact of he Colombian Constitutional Court’ (2004) 3 Washington University Global 
Studies Law Review 529, 575.
94. Except for decisions in which the Constitutional Court seeks to unify its doctrine on 
a given matter (sentencias de unificación) or decisions that are adopted by the full chamber 
(Sala Plena), tutela judgements are issued by review chambers (salas de revisión). The review 
chambers are composed of three magistrates; there are nine chambers, each one presided over by 
one of the nine magistrates. See especially; Decreto Legislativo 2591 de 1991 (which regulates 
the procedure for the abstract review of legal provisions), Decreto Legislativo 2067 de 1991 
(which regulates the procedure for the abstract review of legal provisions), and Ley Estatutaria 
de Justicia 270 de 1996 (which regulates the organization and functioning of the Judiciary). 
95. The formalistic/restrictive interpretations were grounded on two arguments. First, a very 
literal interpretation held that the only fundamental rights were those included in Chapter 1, Tittle 
Two of the Constitution. A second thesis, held that the judicial procedures before the ordinary 
and administrative jurisdictions were, by the sole fact of existing and being legally available, 
the adequate channels to resolve all controversies related to fundamental rights. Tutela actions 
would therefore only proceed when the legal system did not provide a specific solution. cepeda 
espinosa, above n. 93, 575.
96. See especially; C-574/92, C-295/93, C-225/95. The first two cases started the application 
of Colombian Const. art. 93, where international treaties are considered integral part of the Cons-
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Progressively, the Court has expanded the effects of tutela in order to en-
sure the normative value of the Constitution.97 First, seeking a just solution, 
the Court has also expanded the originally inter partes effects of tutela. The 
Court has granted inter communis effects to persons who have not actually 
filed the corresponding tutela, but share common circumstances with the 
plaintiffs, belong to the same community, and might be negatively affected 
by a decision that does not include them.98 Second, the writ now includes all 
State’s authorities and officials as potential respondents in such a claim, making 
them potential violators of the fundamental rights. Third, the jurisprudence 
allows the presentation of tutela claims against private persons in positions of 
power, provided that certain conditions are met. In these terms, the tutela may 
be used against private parties when plaintiff is in a position of subordination 
or otherwise defenceless in relation to the private party against whom the 
claim is directed, a private party seriously harming collective interests, or the 
private party when it is in charge of public services or utilities.99 Fourth, the 
Court has extended tutela against civil, labour, criminal and administrative 
judgements whenever the judge has not followed a relevant constitutional 
precedent to decide the case. To put it briefly, in its interpretation and use 
of tutela, the Court has encouraged the use of tutela, and has established a 
solid doctrine of precedent in Colombia, where traditionally the only source 
of the law has been “the typographic law”.100
Under the 1886 Constitution, the Supreme Court often adopted a formalistic 
approach that helped widen the gap between constitutional law and quotidian 
socio-political life. The Supreme Court focussed predominantly on questions 
such as the jurisdiction of the official who had issued the decision, or the 
procedure by which it was adopted, as opposed to the substantive aspects of 
titution. Sentence C-225/95 coined in Colombia the concept “bloque de constitucionalidad”. It 
refers to the components of the Constitution that go beyond the constitutional text. Apart of the 
international humanitarian law and international human rights treaties, these components are: 
the foreword of the Constitution, the international treaties about borders, international doctrine 
on human right law from the international monitoring bodies. See e. g. mónica aranGo olaya. 
‘El bloque de constitucionalidad en la jurisprudencia de la Corte Constitucional Colombiana’ 
(2004) Precedente 2004, 79-102.
97. cepeda espinosa, above n. 93, 554. 
98. Another examples is inter pares effects decisions. Firstly, the Court may order that the 
constitutional ratio decidendi of a given decision be applied by all judges to every future case 
in which similar circumstances arise. Secondly, It also happens when the Court orders judges 
to stop applying a certain regulation in concrete cases, because it is contrary to a fundamental 
right. Finally, the Court has ordered administrative agencies to design a plan that would benefit 
not only the formal plaintiff, but also all other persons in the same situation. Ibid., 572-573. 
99. Ibid., 647.
100. See especially C-083/95 and C-083/01. See also on binding effects of constitutional 
precedent ratio decidendi, T-566/98 and Colombian Const. art. 13 y 29. The positivistic 
interpretation of law has its pristine source in Colombia in Ley 153 de 1887 and Ley 169 de 
1896. 
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the problems at hand.101 In contrast, the Court has provided different answers, 
balancing the conflicting interests in a real situation without using the formal, 
syllogistic, general-to-particular model. The new constitutional hermeneutics 
have broadened the base of basic liberties, such as personal autonomy and 
individual freedom,102 freedom of religion,103 freedom of press,104 and freedom 
of expression.105 The Court has also been active on equality issues related 
to discrimination on the grounds of gender, sexual orientation, disability, 
extreme poverty, and race.106 Finally, there have been countless judgments 
concerning social, economic rights and collective rights. The Constitution 
not only promotes the protection of individuals from the State and individual 
empowerment, but it also recognizes the existence of different groups and 
101. For instance, cepeda espinosa cites the 1978 judgement declaring the constitutionality 
of a very controversial state of siege decree, Decision of March 9, 1978. It stated that any 
criminal act committed by a member of the armed forces would be justified if it took place during 
previously planned operations launched to prevent or repress activities related to kidnapping and 
drug trafficking. Several justicies expressed concern that this vague, exonerating provision was 
tantamount to a de facto authorization of the death penalty, but the majority of the Court did not 
support this thesis. cepeda espinosa, above n. 93, 543. 
102. Colombian Const., art. 16. In several cases the Court has explored the extend and 
legitimate limitations of personal autonomy. Some examples are the Court’s position in relation 
to the rights of individuals to make decisions that may cause them harm, such as personal drug 
consumption (C-221/1994 and C-026/1995), euthanasia (C-239/1997), and the mandatory use 
of safety belts (C-309/1997)); the right of individuals to determine their personal appearance 
(T-095/1993, T-248/1996 and T-124/1998); and the right to determine one’s own gender identity 
(SU-642/1999). 
103. Colombian Const., art. 19. Despite the overwhelming Catholic majority in Colombia, 
and that a past of absolute protection and official engagement with the Catholic Church –officially 
called Concordato-, the Constitutional Court has granted consistent protection to freedom of 
religion (C-027/1993, C-350/1994, C-1261/2000, and C-224/1994).
104. Colombian Const., art. 20. The Court has pronounced on freedom of the press in 
conflict with privacy (SU-1723/2000); the right to obtain information (T-066/1998); dissemination 
of classified information and personal reputation issues (T-206/1995 and T-066/1998), 
journalists’ licensing (C-087/1998); and on freedom of press and public Order (C-425/1994 and 
C-1024/2002).
105. Colombian Const., art. 20. See especially on the right to be part of strikes as an extension 
of the freedom of expression: SU-667/1998. 
106. Colombian Const., art. 13, on equality as a right, includes six basic elements. First, a 
general principle of equality of treatment, opportunity, and protection, as well as equality before 
the law and in the enjoyment of rights. See particularly in gender equality; Colombian Const., 
art. 43, T-393/1997, T-902/2000, T-270/1997, T-494/1992, and T-624/1995. Second, a prohibition 
on discrimination based on sex, race, national or family origin, language, religion, and political 
or philosophical opinion. See on sexual orientation; T-097/1994, C-481/1998, SU-326/2001, 
and C-814/2001. See especially on race; Colombian Const., art. 13, C-086/1994, T-1042/2001. 
Third, a state duty to promote the conditions necessary to attain real and effective equality. See 
on conditions necessary for persons with disabilities; Colombian Const., art. 47, T-288/1995, 
T-823/1999, T-1134/2000, T-024/2000, T-595/2002, T-427/1992, and T-620/1999). Fourth, the 
possibility of creating advantages for discriminated or marginal groups. See on Extreme Poverty; 
Colombian Const. art. 13. See also on displaced population Section iv of this paper. Fifth, a 
directive to rant special protection to the weak. Finally, sixth, a mandate to punish those who 
abuse and mistreat vulnerable persons.
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grants them a variety of collective rights.107 The Court’s pronouncements for 
equality of treatment in the workplace, health provision and public utilities 
supply stand by their own as highly advanced and responsible, given the 
harsh reality of Colombian life.108
In their approach to social and economic rights violations, the Court has 
assessed claims in accordance with specific conditions of each individual 
case, without strictly attending to the programmatic human rights bias that 
places some political issues beyond the constitutional judge’s radar. The 
Court has consistently subverted spheres of power that would be immune to 
the general duty of respecting the Constitution.109 Although the Court held in 
unanimous decisions that tutela judges should respect expenditure priorities 
adopted through the national budget planning process, the Court may order 
expenditures in exceptional circumstances. The Court has conscientiously 
ordered public or private expenditures when fundamental rights are under 
threat or, in an abstract review process, legislative provisions are in contra-
diction with the fundamental rights and/or the Social State of Law.110 One 
of the most controversial111 – yet common – criteria is when the minimum 
subsistence rights of marginalized or weak groups and individuals are being 
threatened.112 Following this line of reasoning, the Court has determined 
that rights of social or economic nature may be protected using tutela in the 
following situations: (1) when the social and economic rights under threat 
are “by connection” directly linked with another fundamental rights; for 
example, the rights to a health or social security in a situation where the life is 
under threat;113 (2) when social and economic rights are considered in and of 
107. Colombian Const., Title ii, Ch. 3. Until Ley 472 de 1998, tutela was the only available 
mechanism to secure these constitutionally protected rights and interests. After the Ley 472, 
where Acciones Pupulares were regulated as an independent action from tutela, the Court has 
continued to grant protection to different types of collective interests.
108. Topical cases in the workload of the Court are: (1) protection of rights to health, 
which is violated by the lack of provision for treatment, medicine, or surgery prescribed under 
their physician’s diagnosis; (2) un-attendance of the registration with social security entities by 
employers and corresponding payments to the system or disbursement to workers; (3) recognition 
of retirement pensions; or (4) demands of payment of their public salaries or pensions, or private 
salaries, in extreme situations.
109. cepeda espinosa, above n. 93, 659.
110. The most mentioned cases are (1) the tutelas that generate economic costs for the 
state especially in health and education provision; (2) banning of the long-standing regulation 
that used to establish the system for financing the acquisition of housing and was contrary the 
principle of affordability of housing (C-383/1999, C-700/1999, C-747/1999, C-955/2000 and 
C-1192/2001); and (3) deciding on the laws that regulate annual increases in public employees 
salaries (C-815/1999, C-1433/2000 and C-1064/2001).
111. See e. g. rodolFo aranGo. ‘La justiciabilidad de los derechos sociales fundamentales’ 
(2001) 12 Revista de Derecho Público; rodolFo aranGo. ‘Basic Social Rights’ (2001) 16 Ratio 
Juris, 141.
112. See e. g. SU-111/1997. See also: SU-225/1998.
113. In the case of protection of the right to health or a healthy environment when them is 
necessary to ensure the continuity and quality of life; T-534/1992, T-123/1999.
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themselves fundamental, that is, in the case of the right to adequate nutrition 
or elementary education of children;114 and (3) when social and economic 
rights are elements of the minimum conditions of dignified subsistence, the 
right to survival – or mínimo vital, which is based on the constitutional rights 
to life, health, work, and social security.115 
Some of the Court’s strongest critics argue that its combative protection of 
the Constitution creates a high degree of economic and political instability. 
They have stated that as a consequence of its judicial activism, the Court 
has consistently increased public expenditures, disregarding the negative 
long-term macroeconomic effects of its decision.116 Despite these critiques, 
the Court has confirmed the basic thesis that social rights can be enforced 
through tutela decisions. The sheer cost of protecting a right has not mounted 
a sufficient economic or political argument for disregarding clear constitu-
tional mandates upholding the effective enjoyment of rights and the state’s 
duty to safeguard life, personal integrity and human dignity.117 The Court’s 
progressive protection of social and economic rights, and in particular the 
configuration and protection of a mínimo vital, have had the practical effect 
to entitle persons, principally in conditions of absolute poverty, to prompt and 
effective assistance to fulfil their most basic needs.118 The right to survival 
114. See especially: SU-225/1998. 
115. Mínimo vital was established in the case T-426/1992. See especially in the case of 
minimum subsistence and income; T-606/1999 and SU-995/1999. The right to survival acquired 
a material force when there is a threat to one of the core rights and the State has the capacity 
to prevent serious harm; if both elements are present, and proved in the context of a tutela 
writ, then the state has a duty to rescue, and judicial protection is in order. The Constitutional 
Court has used this rule in cases when there is a significant delay in the payment of, or in the 
recognition of entitlement to social security; delay in the payment of salaries, discriminatory 
dismissal of a pregnant woman, the lack of provision of health care services, and the exclusion 
of vital medicines and treatments from the Colombian Mandatory Health Plan. See reference 
to specific cases: julieta lemaitre ripoll. ‘Someone writes to the Colonel: Judicial Protection 
of the Rights to Survival in Colombia and the State’s Duty to Rescue’ (paper presented at the 
sela 2005, Law and Poverty, Panel 2: The Institutional Strategies for Eradicating Poverty, Rio 
de Janeiro, Brazil, June 16-19, 2005), 2 [islandia.law.yale.edu/sela/sela2005.htm] at 15 April 
2006. In 2005 a Senate Committee discussed a new version of the writ of tutela –acción de 
tutela “social”. It would be focus on the protection of core rights of the mínimo vital (the right to 
nourishment, health, housing, basic education, employment and social security). While ensuring 
the protection of the right to survival, the acción de tutela social, would maximize its benefits for 
the people in grater disadvantage controlling current opportunistic uses of the generic acción de 
tutela. See especially: carlos Gaviria díaz et al. Ponencia para primer debate al proyecto de 
Ley Etatutaria número 01 de 2005 Senado: por medio de la cual se regula la protección judicial 
de algunos derechos sociales, Senado de la República, Colombia (22 August 2005).
116. See e. g. huGo palacios. ‘El control de constitucionalidad en el Trópico’, Precedente 
(2001); serGio clavijo. ‘Fallos y fallas económicas de las altas cortes: el caso de Colombia 1991-
2000’ (2001) 12 Revista de Derecho Público; maurice KuGler and howard rosenthal. ‘Check 
and balances: An Assessment of the Institutional Separation of Political Powers in Colombia’, 
in alberto alesina (ed.). Institutional Reforms: The Case of Colombia (2005), 80.
117. cepeda espinosa, above n. 93, 643.
118. Ibid., 619.
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not only subverts an exclusive model of justice, based on the possibility to 
afford a lawyer or circumvent the system, but also allows the poor privileged 
access to a procedural and material justice. It forces the law to leave behind the 
pretension of neutrality and assume an active role solving class imbalances.119 
In this case, the law has been instrumentalized, passing from a submissive 
function, to a law that can also be used symbolically by those who require 
it. Without tutela, the legal system would have continued to reproduce the 
status quo, while daily impotence before the powerful would have remained 
hidden under the mantle of progressive legislation that enshrines democracy 
and the faceless of rule of law.120 
B. DE-FORMALIZATION AND CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF LAW
The priority and applicability of the Social Rule of Law State and the bill of 
fundamental rights in Colombian constitutional interpretation has brought about 
a transformation of the formalistic notion of law among judges, officials, and 
legal practitioners. Methodologically, the substantialist approach has privile-
ged values, principles, interests and rights over jurisdictions, administrative 
spheres of actions and formalities. Normatively, the social reality and the 
search for concrete solution have acquired relevance over formal procedures 
or abstract legal categories. Such a transformation was not explicit in the 
constitutional text, but has resulted from discursive strategies of the Court, 
which has developed an appropriate scenario to work within the context of 
the 1991 Constitution.121 The protection of rights over formalities, and the 
balance of principles and values instead of a syllogistic application of law, 
was a paradigmatic leap for a Latin American country with a legal culture of 
ritual forms, inaccessible judicial hierarchies and endless procedures.122
In terms of actual cases, the new hermeneutics engendered through the 
work of the Court have opened up a set of judicial solutions that go beyond 
the pre-1991 black-and-white commands of the Supreme Court. In current 
constitutional litigation, the judge must arrive at a solution that achieves the 
maximum protection and minimum restriction of all of the values involved 
in the claim. Hence, the constitutional judge – potentially every Colombian 
judge – is required to consider the impact of his or her decisions in the 
context in which they will operate. Clearly, it is no longer possible to select 
119. lemaitre ripoll, above n. 115, 12.
120. Ibid., 4.
121. For instance dieGo lópez has studied the Court’s own interpretation of Hart and 
dworKin according to the Colombian context. hart has given to the Court the basis to expose 
ambiguities and vagueness in the law; and, dworKin, the Court has borrowed the substance for 
judicial creation of law and moral attitudes toward the decisional process. lópez medina, above 
n. 35.
122. cepeda espinosa, above n. 93, 651.
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general rules and apply them to concrete cases, as most Colombian lawyers 
were taught to do through a simple Código Civil’s type-syllogism. Today, 
Colombian judges and lawyers must consider factors and criteria that emerge 
from the specific facts of each case and then they may establish the links to 
conflicting values, interests, rights, and principles, not the other way around. 
In response, a new set of legal constructions have come about: mínimo vital, 
proporcionalidad, test de razonabilidad, protección especial, erradicación de 
las justicias presentes and núcleo esencial de los derechos humanos; concepts 
which would have sounded alien and beyond the law two decades ago.123
The principle of legal interpretation according to the Constitution – trig-
gered by the Constitution’s values, principles, rights and actions, but ignited 
by the Court – has prompted judges to apply constitutional norms and incor-
porate constitutional arguments into their legal reasoning, disregarding legal 
thematic boundaries. This assimilation has occurred through the growing 
use of tutela and constitutional abstract reviews. For instance in labour law 
cases, the Court has addressed matters like the timely payment of salaries, the 
adequate recognition and payment of retirement pensions, the protection of 
pregnant workers, even those hired through “temporary worker” companies, 
the prohibition of changing the legal personality of company to avoid labour 
obligations, respect for the right to strike, and the prohibition of discrimination 
against trade union members. In criminal cases, the Courts addressed issues 
such as the constitutional limitations upon the types of admissible evidence, 
the scope of exclusionary rule, the protection of defendants’ procedural rights 
(including the right to an adequate technical defence), the rights of prison 
inmates, and the obligations to respect procedural delays. In administrative 
law, the Court has considered topics such as the right to obtain adequate and 
timely answers to petitions, the conditions upon which informal traders can 
be banned from invading public space, and the application of constitutional 
principles governing public service. Finally, in civil law cases, the Court has 
decided on the rights and duties of family members vis-à-vis each other, a 
person’s obligation to give alimony to a divorced and gravely ill partner, and 
the application of constitutional social functions to private property.124 The 
primary commitment to protect fundamental rights has begun to surface in 
all types of judicial decisions, a phenomenon that is now recognized as the 
“constitucionalización del derecho ordinario”.125
As analysed in Section ii, a salient feature of Colombia is the tremendous 
fragmentation of political and social forces that have imploded in a general 
123. Ibid., 661. At some degree this is a validation of marK van hoecKe’s Law as Commu-
nication, due to the Court’s use of institutional legitimation and communicative legitimation 
through a process of conceptual creation. See e. g. marK van hoecKe. Law as Communication 
(2002), 208.
124. Complete references of these cases are in cepeda espinosa, above n. 93, 656-658.
125. mauricio García-villeGas and rodriGo uprimny. La reforma a la tutela: ¿ajuste o 
desmonte? (2002), 7.
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state of fear. With the arrival of the 1991 Constitution, a legal common ground 
was created throughout a democratic consensus. Obviously, as with all de-
mocratic attempts at consensus, it was representative and therefore partial. 
Nevertheless, this consensus has been consolidated by the Court’s work over 
the past fifteen years. The gap between law and society is acquiring new 
shades. It is not simply reinterpreted with several legal or illegal legalities. 
The Constitution has offered a scenario where a judicial reading is compat-
ible with substance instead of form, the material instead of the procedural, 
the structural and subjective instead of the positive and objective. There 
has thus been a transfer of claims from the non-existent political forum to a 
responsive judicial forum. Despite all the risks that this transfer implies, in 
principle there should be no room for silence in the Courts. Power-holders 
cannot avoid debate or refuse to respond to the Court as they can do in the 
market or in the political arena.126 In this way, the Colombian Constitution 
experience is unusual: Colombians have used law – the most essential instru-
ment for domination in society – to achieve some level of social emancipation 
establishing a virtuous building block of institutional hegemony.
IV. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE QUOTIDIAN: EMANCIPATION AND RISKS 
It is possible to formulate the gap between social experiences and expectations 
in Colombia as a problem to be overcome by social emancipation. However, 
it is difficult to find in the collective memory of Colombian a struggle or a 
movement that have worked towards ‘social emancipation’ that is not linked 
to violence and fear. The only collective memories that approximate this idea 
are the anti-colonial struggles during Colombia’s fight for independence and 
the guerrilla struggles. But in these struggles, the final benefits were, and 
have been, concentrated in the hands of few, who ably manipulated more 
widespread aspirations. The ideas of good order and good society, held by 
both independent caudillos as illegal gangs, have often been couched in the 
religious and authoritarian terms of their pedagogic agendas. They have 
translated force of arms into the force of reason/legal reason.127 According 
to santos, this has been achieved through the affirmation of religious law 
rather than secular law, formality rather than substance, revelation rather 
than revolution.128 However, according to the argument that I have been 
attempting to sustain here, the 1991 Constitution and Constitutional Court 
126. See e. g. jorGe correa sutil. ‘Access to Justice and Judicial Reforms in Latin America: 
Any Hope of Equality?’ (paper presented at the sela 1999, Equality, Panel 6: Equality in the 
Administration of justice, La Serena, Chile, June 17-20, 1999), [islandia.law.yale.edu/sela/jcorre.
pdf] at 15 May 2005.
127. taussiG, above n. 63, 92. 
128. sousa santos. Toward a New Legal Common Sense, above n 15, 444.
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have managed to resolve some of the dissonances between law and society, 
and the ineffectiveness of law before reality, a project that has produced subs-
tantive, positive outcomes for people who have traditionally been excluded 
from the locus of power. 
A. CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF DAILy LIFE
The Court’s interpretation and protection of Constitutional mandates have been 
outstanding, not only because of the variety of subjects that it has addressed, 
but also because it has, to a certain degree, reformed the Colombian social 
perception of the law with its responsiveness and progressive orientation.129 
When the Court began its work, the Colombian population turned to the 
constitutional instance to demand answers to problems that, in principle, 
should be debated by means of citizen’s participation in the political sphere 
and resolved by the State’s action.130 Their demand for equality and justice 
shifted from the political field, the most adequate scenario of social eman-
cipation, to the judicial field – a restrictive landscape that traditionally has 
been identified by its violent symbolic use.131 However, in the context of the 
Colombian State’s institutional fragmentation and lack of hegemony, there 
was a space for action by the Court. uprimny and García-villeGas observe 
that ‘[o]n many occasions, what has taken place is not that the Court takes 
on other powers, but rather that it has stepped in to fill the vacuum that they 
have left.’132 Nationwide, the number of tutelas and constitutional actions 
has steadily increased during the last fifteen year. There were 10732 tutelas 
presented across the whole country in 1992; in 2002, the number had increa-
sed by 141609. Of those tutelas presented, the Court selected 590 in 1992 
and 1161 in 2002 for review and decision. By mid-2004, the accumulated 
total of tutelas examined by the Court was 21793. This same growth has 
been witnessed in the number of constitutional reviews of statutes, cons-
titutional amendments, legislative decrees and treaties: 69 demands were 
filled in 1992, and 358 in 2002. By mid-2004, the accumulated number of 
constitutional reviews was 3868. Roughly the Court had an output of 26000 
decisions by mid-2004.133 These figures represent how the Constitution has 
129. uprimny and García-villeGas. ‘The Constitutional Court and Social Emancipation 
in Colombia’, above n 27, 66.
130. boaventura de sousa santos and leonardo avritzer. ‘Opening Up the Canon of 
Democracy’, in sousa santos (ed.). Reinventing Social Emancipation: Toward New Manifestos, 
Volume 1: Democratizing Democracy: Beyond the Liberal Democratic Canon (2005), iii.
131. See especially: pierre bourdieu. ‘The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the 
Juridical Field’ (1987) 38 Hastings Law Journal 805.
132. uprimny and García-villeGas. ‘The Constitutional Court and Social Emancipation 
in Colombia’, above n. 27, 73.
133. Figures of this brief quantitative overview come from the Court’s website (www.
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deeply touched most aspects of Colombian life, reinterpreting social conflict 
as constitutional problems.
The constitutional reform in Colombia is a paradigmatic case whose total 
failure should be declared if is only evaluated in light of the social, political 
and economic situation that Colombia still experiences. Nonetheless, the 
Constitution has generated a social phenomenon termed “constitutionalization 
of daily life”, a nascent social habitus.134 It differs with the traditional habitus 
of domination through law; instead appealing to the constitutional rights as 
a shared normative standard of sociopolitical expectations, individual and 
collective behaviour and institutional judgment. According to wacQuant, 
habitus is a practical competency, which is acquired through and for action, 
which operates beneath the level of consciousness, a matrix of perceptions that 
comes into place when one performs an action according to socially learned 
patterns.135 However, while habitus sediments individual and group history 
in the body, habitus is shaped in the cognitive struggle according to the time, 
place, and configuration of contemporary socio-political power.136 
The 1991 Constitution and jurisprudence of the Court have increasingly 
channelled and articulated the frustrations, hopes and expectations of Co-
lombians. From a constitutive understanding of the relation between law and 
society, the Constitution is conceived as a form of organizing the world into 
categories and concepts that contribute to the formation of the conscience 
and, as such, determining the course of human actions. This constitutive 
vision substitutes the dynamic and instrumentality of legal production as an 
exclusive artefact of the State.137 This complexity is supposed to explain not 
just the occasional impact of the constitutionalization of rights in Colombian 
law, but rather how the constitutional categories have framed daily conflicts 
in legal terms and how they, as social representations, have modify ways of 
thinking about, and responding to, those problems and conflicts.138 This has 
happened not only on the individual level; the tutela has also served as the key 
point for organizational processes and collective mobilization that dispute the 
constitucional.gov.co/corte/) and catalina botero marino. Justicia Constitucional en 
Iberoamerica: Colombia, Instituto de Derecho Público Comparado, Universidad Carlos iii de 
Madrid (2002) [www.uc3m.es/uc3m/inst/MGP/JCI/02-colombia.htm] at 17 May 2006. 
134. esteban restrepo. ‘Constitutional Reform and Social Progress: The Constitutiona-
lization of Daily Life in Columbia’ (paper presented at the sela 2002, Law as object of trans-
formation, Panel 2: The new wave of constitutionalism, Punta del Este, Uruguay, June 6-9, 2002), 
11 [islandia.law.yale.edu/sela/paper.htm] at 15 May 2006.
135. wacQuant, above n. 36, 316.
136. pierre bourdieu and loïc wacQuant. ‘The Cunning of Imperialist Reason’ in Symbolic 
Power and Democratic Governance’, in loïc wacQuant. The Mystery of Ministry: Pierre Bourdieu 
and Democratic Politics (2005), 178.
137. restrepo, above n. 134, 11.
138. See on human rights as social representation e. g. williem doise. Human Rights as 
Social Representations (2002).
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discourse and social structures.139 In the majority of these struggles, a combi-
nation of strategies for political and legal actions to remedy the situation of 
those affected is evident. These range from citizenry recognition, to the use of 
constitutional judgments as consolidation of public consciousness. In this way, 
the constitutional ground has established a sort of tactical counter-hegemonic 
alliance between the Court and certain social sectors that have been excluded 
or hindered from developing the emancipatory values enshrined in the 1991 
Constitution. Good examples of these progressive alliances are towards the 
protection of minorities, gender groups and consumer groups.140
The ubiquitous of the Constitution has induced a positive motion toward 
reconstructing Colombian social and political relations by promoting more 
just interpersonal and collective relations.141 Constitutional legal constructions, 
such as the new legal language by the Court, have gone beyond the courts 
and appeared in the everyday Colombian lexicon. Becoming very evident 
the new habitus mentioned above, Colombians have taken tutela, the writ, 
and translated into a common verb: entutelar. In making tutela an action, 
the writ has re-established a connection with the other through a process of 
recognition instead of subordination, and argumentation instead of annula-
tion. From this point of view, it is possible to see that a constitutionalization 
of daily life tends to activate the emancipatory agenda of rights: the justice 
behind the norm, the politics for rights rather the politics of rights.142 
139. See especially the uprimny and García villeGas study in which they establish some 
parameters to examen the emancipatory potentials of different types of constitutional claims 
according to the rights involved in the case and the geographical, social, political and economic 
context within which they are inscribed: uprimny and García-villeGas. ‘The Constitutional 
Court and Social Emancipation in Colombia’, above n. 27.
140. The recognition of indigenous population autonomy is an epitome of progressivism 
and historical responsibility. For instance, the Court has completely abandoned the assimilationist 
perspective of imposing individualistic, occidental conceptions upon indigenous people. The 
constitutional recognition of indigenous collective rights, and individual indigenous in relation 
with their community, have given rise to a reinvigoration on the need to preserve the indigenous 
cultural identity and guarantee its long-term survival. It has also created a space where individual 
rights have been articulated to coexist with rights of the community. The most important cases 
have been: (1) indigenous territorial rights actively enforced by a constitutional judge, (2) the 
right to establish and enforce indigenous legal norms, and (3) the right to preserve the integrity 
of the culture to external influences. Examples of these situations are (1) the 1997 judgement 
where the Court ordered the suspension of oil exploitation project in the U’wa territory because 
the previous consultation requirements had not been met (SU/039-1997); (2) the acceptance 
of corporal punishment with a whip-like instrument as acceptable according to the indigenous 
autonomy and conformance with a standard of “minimum inter-cultural consensus” formed by 
the right to life, the prohibition of torture and slavery, and the application of cultural procedural 
requirements (T/523-1997 and T-394-1999); and finally, (3) the preference for preservation 
of cultural identity and integrity in front of the freedom of religion. In the last case, the Court 
upheld the right of the Arahuaco authorities to prevent a Protestant church form preach within 
tribal land and converting members of the community (SU/510-1998).
141 restrepo, above n. 134, 4. 
142 upendra baxi. The Future of human Rights (2002), viii.
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The Court and Constitutional intervention appears legitimate to broad 
sectors of society that feel that there is at least one able power exists that 
acts progressively. Since access to constitutional justice is straightforward, 
and the constitutional judges tend to adopt progressive positions, many social 
groups have made use of legal arguments rather than resorting to personal 
confrontation. The recognition of a violation, or the recognition of duties 
towards the effective satisfaction of the petitioner’s fundamental rights, 
activates a mode of social subordination to a shared order that constrains 
and protects.143 Anti-formalism and constitutionalization of law have made 
the Constitution a forum where the most difficult, pressing, complex, and 
sensitive national problems have found increasingly legitimate responses. 
None the less, it is precisely these successful achievements by the Court in 
unfolding citizenry awareness that have revealed the contradictions and limits 
of citizenship under an overreaching human rights reading.144
B. EMANCIPATION UNDER THREAT
For Justice cepeda espinosa, the bill of rights included in the new Consti-
tution, and its interpretation by the Court, has become ‘one of the Colom-
bian people’s most noteworthy collective achievements.’145 This position 
of general optimism has been based on the assumption that talking about 
rights is the same as talking about a coordinated social empowerment, or 
that a constitutional protection is equivalent to the redemption of Colombian 
sense of human dignity. yet, social change through the law is the result of a 
complicated formula. The law and the rights embedded in the Constitution 
are two of an important set of components or conditions within a universal 
of institutions, a habitus entrenched in the popular culture, national lobby-
ing groups, violent alliances, and external economic and political forces. 
Because the realities that gave rise to the 1991 constitutional reform were 
serious and pervasive, the aspirations of the Constitution were naturally 
harder to achieve.146 The broad and deep aspirations of the 1991 Constitu-
tion required a synchronization of these forces to ensure the progressive 
improvement of conditions of the whole project called Colombia, However, 
the social and institutional context in which the constitutional reform has 
been applied has proved largely unfavorable to the fulfillment of its expec-
tations. García-villeGas points out four basic obstacles that challenge the 
143. restrepo, above n. 134, 16. 
144. emir sader. ‘Toward New Democracies’, in sousa santos (ed.). Reinventing Social 
Emancipation: Toward New Manifestos, Volume 1: Democratizing Democracy - Beyond the 
Liberal Democratic Canon (2005), 458.
145. cepeda espinosa, above n. 93, 575.
146. García-villeGas. ‘Law as Hope’, above n. 59, 364.
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good intentions of the current Constitution.147 First, Colombia has been at 
war for 150 years and has experienced prolonged internal unrest since its 
foundation. Although Colombia’s paramilitary groups declared a unilateral 
cease-fire in 2002, in practice both guerrillas and paramilitary groups con-
tinue to commit massacres, assassinations, acts of torture, and other grave 
breaches of international humanitarian law. This generates a field where 
survival translates into opportunism, lack of social compassion, despair, and 
political blindness.148 Second, the Colombian political system is often driven 
by a politics of survival where patrimonialism and clientelism are prevalent. 
Without tackling these tendencies, citizenship-building will be undermined 
by class interests and pressure groups. Third, Colombian society is a puzzle 
of micro-realities due to the existence of severe social inequalities. In the 
arenas of law and justice, economic marginalization in an already impover-
ished nation means that many people are silenced from the legal order and, 
from any positive externalities of the judiciary activity. Finally, Colombia 
has not avoided global practices of State reductionism, trade liberalization, 
and de-regulation of labour market. Since the beginning of 1990s – coeval 
with the enactment of the Constitution – governments have been dismantling 
the incipient traces of the State. 
The experience of Colombia’s internally displaced population (idp) offers 
a clear summary of the challenges to the new Constitution. Internally dis-
placement is a consequence of Colombia’s violence; often a response to fear 
generated by indiscriminate attacks from all parties to the conflict, but in 
many cases to massacres, selective killings, torture, and specific threats.149 
The Consultancy on Human Rights and Displacement (Codhes), estimates 
that during the period 1985-2005, 3.5 million Colombians were displaced.150 
147. Ibid., 367.
148. The intensification of the displacement is linked with the acceleration of the conflict 
since the Presidential project Seguridad Democratica (2002-2006). Seguridad Democráctica and 
the past presidential anti-drug policy frames have been heavily sponsored by the US Government 
Plan Colombia since 1999. See especially: jenniFer s. holmes. ‘Plan Colombia, Violence, and 
Citizen Support in Colombia’, in jenniFer s. holmes (ed.). New Approaches to Comparative 
Politics: Insights from Political Theory (2003), 83-105. 
149. Internally Displaced Persons (idps), according to the United Nations, are defined as 
“persons who have been forced to flee their homes as a result of armed conflicts, situations of 
generalized violence, violations of human rights, natural or human-made disasters, and who have 
not crossed an internationally recognized State border.” See U.N. Economic and Social Council, 
Commission on Human Rights, 55th sess., provisional agenda item 14(c), Specific Groups and 
Individuals: Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-
General on Internally Displaced Persons Submitted in Accordance with Commission Resolution 
1999/47, Addendum: Profiles in Displacement: Follow-Up Mission to Colombia, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/2000/83/Add.1 (2000), para. 2.
150. Codhes. ‘Conflicto humano y crisis humanitariano en Colombia: Desplazados en el 
limbo’, Codhes Bulletin No. 56 (2005). See also: hiram ruiz. Colombians Flee War Without End, 
Migration Information Source, (1st December 2002) [www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/
display.cfm?ID=76] at 14 April 2006.
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Since 2002 at least 3 million people have been forced out of their homes and 
communities. That is, over 5 percent of Colombia’s total population of 43 
million has been forcibly displaced in the last three years alone. Displace-
ment disproportionately affects indigenous, Afro-Colombians, women and 
children.151 Nearly 50 percent of displaced Colombians are unemployed. Most 
live in shantytowns surrounding Colombia’s largest cities and find only poorly 
paid day labour or work in the informal economy.152 The condition of the 
idp represents the political and legal vacuum where the lives of almost two 
million people, the most impoverished Colombians, have been abandoned.
Ley 387 of 1997 established the State’s responsibility for formulating 
policies and adopting measures for the prevention of internal displacement 
and the protection and socio-economic stabilization of the idp. However, aid 
has been largely insufficient, and national coverage limited. In early 2004, 
the State’s system of attention for the displaced population had reached such 
a state of crisis that the Colombian Court ruled that the State’s idp policy was 
not providing satisfactory results. Indeed, the problems were such that they 
amounted to an “unconstitutional state of affairs” – un estado inconstitucional 
de cosas.153 The decision was based on a repeated and constant violation of 
151. Of those recorded as displaced by the Social Solidarity Network between 1995 and 
August 2005 and whose ages are known, 54 percent were under age eighteen. See Red de 
Solidaridad Social, Registro Único de Población Desplazada (2006) [www.red.gov.co] at 26 
June 2006. Sixty-three percent of those who are forcibly displaced relocate to Colombia’s largest 
cities, according to the ombudsman’s office (Defensoría del Pueblo). See especially: Defensoría 
del Pueblo. El desplazamiento forzado en Colombia (2002). 25-27. Codhes estimated that 33 
percent of those displaced in 2002 were Afro-Colombian. Even though less than 4 percent of the 
national population is Afro-Colombian, according to the 1993 census, Afro-Colombians are far 
more likely than other groups to suffer displacement. Similarly, some 12 percent of Colombia’s 
displaced population is indigenous, even though indigenous peoples make up less than 2.5 percent 
of the national population. Codhes. ‘Conflicto humano y crisis humanitariano en Colombia: 
Desplazados en el limbo’, Codhes Bulletin No. 56 (2005).
152. See liliana obreGón, and maría stavropoulou. ‘In Search of Hope: The Plight of 
Displaced Colombians’, in roberta cohen and Francis m. donG (ed.). The Forsaken People: 
Case Studies of the Internally Displaced (1998). The conflict has added more than 400,000 idps 
to Bogota’s urban poverty belt, which includes the huge informal settlements of Sumapaz, Ciudad 
Bolívar, Usme, and Soacha. miKe davis. Planet of Slums (2006), 49. The current sub-employment 
in Colombia is 32%. Departamento Nacional de Estadística (Dane). Síntesis Estadística Semanal 
– Semana del 12 al 16 de junio (2006).
153. See especially: T-025/2004 (January 22, 2004). The declaration of an “unconstitutional 
state of affairs” (estado inconstitucional de cosas) was declared first in the cases T/714 1996 and 
T/025 of 1994 when the court condemned the conditions of jails. It is an exception to the inner 
limitation of justifiability of social rights. Due to a gross violation of fundamental rights of a 
specific group (jailed population or internal displaced population) and under specific limitations 
(such as general clamour of justice, potential justice system overburden caused by several actions 
denouncing the same violations) the Constitutional Court has allowed itself to go beyond the 
constitutional constrains imposed by the State’s scarcity of resources. The Court declaring an 
“unconstitutional state of affairs” have made a difference between a basic core of social rights, 
which is justiciable; and an extended layer of them, which is only justiciable in a programmatic 
way. Thus, in an extreme situation of violation of social rights, they became justiciable (what has 
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fundamental rights affecting a multitude of persons and requiring the inter-
vention of several entities to attend to problems of a structural nature.154 The 
Court ordered the State to identify the number and needs of the displaced 
population, define a comprehensive national plan of action, determine the 
resources for this plan, and, within six months of the Court’s decision, ensure 
that all displaced persons enjoy a “minimum level of protection” of their 
rights. In response to the decision, the government enacted a new national 
plan of action and increased the budget for programs that assist displaced 
persons.155 Nevertheless, in a series of three orders issued in August and 
September 2005, the Court found that the government’s response fell short 
of what was required to remedy el estado inconstitucional de cosas.156 
Facing the same contradictions, rajaGopal points out that despite the 
opportunities for contestation using human rights law, individual and group 
discourses can become uncertain.157 In the case of Colombia’s idp, the Court 
currently is witnessing how its role can passed from being an example of 
emancipation to become an empty constitutional exercise. To state that the 
situation of the idp represents an “unconstitutional state of affairs”, the Court is 
challenging well-established conventions. The interrogation of the Colombian 
social contract itself is also a question about the history of law production, 
formalism, positivism and ineffectiveness of law – in this case Ley 387 of 
1997. However, as strong as the declaration of an unconstitutional state of 
affairs sounds, it is simply a rhetorical claim about the validity of the social 
contract. It appears to push to the limit the Court’s capacity to de-formalize 
and reconstruct the law on constitutional grounds – it is the court trying to 
push the nation-building project by its own. yet, at the end of the exercise, 
come to be called erradicación de las injusticias presentes), and the state capacity and scarcity 
of resources are put aside in order to bring some immediate release. See the origin of the theory 
‘erradicación de las injusticias presentes’, in SU/225-1998, T/177-1999, T/772-2003 and C/617-
2002. See especially: lemaitre ripoll, above n. 115.
154. See especially: T-025/2004. See also: Comisión Colombiana de Juristas. Alcances y 
retos de la sentencia T-025 de la Corte Constitucional sobre el desplazamiento forzado (May 
2004).
155. See especially: Ley 917/2004 (December 3, 2004).
156. Auto No. 176 of 2005 (Const. Ct. August 29, 2005), p. 1. See also: Codhes. Los autos 
de la Corte (September 21st 2005).
157. balaKrishnan rajaGopal. ‘Limits of Law in Counter-Hegemoinc Globalization: The 
Indian Supreme Court and the Narmada Valley Struggle’, in boaventura de sousa santos and 
césar rodríGuez. Law and Globalization from Below: Toward a Cosmopolitan Legality (2005), 
188. See on how human rights can be either a source of emancipation or a technology of domi-
nation: balaKrishnan rajaGopal. ‘Counter-Hegemonic International Law: Rethinking Human 
Rights and Development as a Third World Strategy’ (Paper presented at the Human Rights and 
Global Justice Conference, Scarman House, University of Warwick, UK, 29 – 31 March 2006) 
at [www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/events/past/2006/rightsandjustice] at 15 May 2006, 3-4; 
sundhya pahuja. ‘Operationalising the Universal: Development and the Rule of Law’ (Paper 
presented at the Human Rights and Global Justice Conference, Scarman House, University 
of Warwick, UK, 29 – 31 March 2006) [www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/events/past/2006/
rightsandjustice/] at 15 May 2006, 12.
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both structural inequalities remain and the perceptual value of constitutional 
rights has been eroded. If the Court cannot deliver the expectations that the 
Constitution has encoded, the emancipatory power of the Court’s decisions 
will slip into the arena of political manipulation. The judicial empowerment 
through the 1991 constitutional fortification of rights may provide an effective 
institutional way for traditional politicians to remain in their positions and 
even diminish a possible scrutiny of the government’s policies.158 Therefore, 
the transfer of major issues to the Court by the Executive, the Legislative 
and the corporate sector might be a sinister way of insulating policymaking 
from popular political pressures. In this sense, judicializing politics through 
the constitutionalization of daily life in Colombia may amount to politicians, 
civil servants and civil society as a whole transferring their responsibilities 
onto the Court. 
Voicing the idp’s grievances in terms to which the Courts can respond and 
government can ignore, they risk stunting their own aspirations and pleading 
for permission to conform to the statu quo. In this context, the claim for and 
the recognition of rights run the risk of becoming a folkloric, mechanic, and 
bureaucratic habitus that threatens the institutional prevalence of the Court 
and the counter-hegemonic pretensions of these rights. From this perspective, 
the fruitful use of the bill of rights may become trapped in the self-imposed 
limits of human rights discourse. To paraphrase baxi, the Colombian cons-
titutionalization of rights emerges as Herculean in its most creative moment, 
but at other times better resembles Sisyphus.159 
V. CONCLUSION
The arguments presented in this paper looked for establishing a ground in 
which Colombian constitutional text must by read, evaluated and compared 
on the basis of its particularities and not just in its similarities with the wave 
for the constitutionalization of rights that have swept the world in the last 
three decades. Importantly, the particularities that this article brings to the 
forefront of analysis are not confined to the 1991 Constitution legal charac-
ter, they are instead social in essence. The 1991 Constitution has become a 
necessary reference point for anyone who wishes to know in detail what has 
transpired in Colombia during the last years. The project of making the law 
effective and realizable became a shaping agent of the State nation building 
project, as well as a landmark in the social imaginary. It has served as a 
nationwide common referent to claim for or to contest social revindication, 
something that has been long due in the country. It promoted the alliance of 
disparate groups, bound not only by shared economic or political interests 
158. hirschl, above n. 4, 235. 
159. baxi, above n. 142, viii.
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but also by a particular normative view. It is also important to note that the 
1991 Constitution has not entirely fulfilled its creators’ ambitions for peace. 
The Constitution, fundamental rights and tutela have been efficiently able to 
protect what Osuna calls the microderechos de la cotidianeidad, but the role it 
has played in resolving the chronic violence is less clear.160 As a result of the 
Colombia’s state of affairs, the 1991 Constitution aspired to be an omnipotent 
and redeeming legal project. These ideals gave the new Constitution political, 
legal and social resonance, but they have also proved to be self-destructive 
when the whole Colombian nation-building enterprise gravitates to a purely 
judicial flank. In this crossroad between the social nature of the Constitution 
and its capacity and limitations to revindicate the construction of the State 
lays a promising agenda for further research and political action. 
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